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The Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Oil & Gas Industry: 
Evidence from Canadian and American Transactions 
Di Lu 
The study investigates the determinants of mergers and acquisitions in the oil 
and gas industry over the ten-year period from 2002 to 2011. Our large sample 
analysis results indicate that in the O&G industry: (1) U.S. acquirers are larger 
than Canadian acquirers overall; (2) value bidders generate greater abnormal 
returns relative to glamour bidders in Canadian market; (3) the geographical 
proximity of headquarters cannot generate pronounced synergies, and even 
destroys penny stock bidder’s value; and (4) there is no mispricing effect in the 
penny stocks, but they are more illiquid and have a higher level of idiosyncratic 
risk. We also examine three cases in 2012-2013 to verify our results and to 
identify several firm specific factors that are not considered in the large sample 
analysis. Consistent with our expectations, the Canadian transaction is more 
straightforward whereas the U.S. transactions depend more on pre-existing 
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Figure 1: The estimated global energy consumption growth in percentage 
change over one year period 
 
Reprint from: Special report: Industries in 2014 (2013).The Economist Intelligence Unit.  
 
The fabric of the energy sector is changing rapidly worldwide. Coal is used less 
and less; wind and solar power are expanding fast.
 1
 The oil and gas industry, the 
traditional energy industry, is facing great challenges. On one hand, the U.S., the 
largest consumer of oil in the world and Canada’s key client, is seeking a 
diminished dependence on net oil imports. On the other hand, new customers are 
appearing in Asia, with China becoming the second largest oil consumer 
                                                 
1
 The estimated consumption of petroleum and other liquids is 35.87 quadrillion British thermal 
unit (Btu) per year, whereas the estimated consumption of non-hydro renewable energy (the sum 
of other renewable energy and other) is 2.36 quadrillion Btu per year from EIA’s Annual Energy 
Outlook 2014. The estimated U.S. GDP annual growth is 1.9% in 2013 and 2.1% in 2014 from 
Global Economic Prospects (June 10, 2014). 
2 
 
worldwide. In order to win new clients, both Canadian and American oil and gas 
firms are seeking to lower their production costs and improve their transportation 
capability.
 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit., 2013A, 2013B, 2013C, 2013E, 
2013G) 
However, the new projects in the oil and gas industry are always the heart of 
the matter because many large companies and government decisions are involved. 
Recently, a heated debate about economic benefits and environmental controversy 
was triggered over “Petrobec” and the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit., 2013D, 2014A, 2014B) There will be other 
problems about the new projects even after government approval. Take liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) as an example, a gas glut appeared after the Canadian 
government approved 7 new projects and the U.S. government approved 4 new 
projects, leading to a low gas price. (The Economist Intelligence Unit., 2013F) 
While government approval and strict investigations are required for a new 
project, mergers and acquisitions based on existing properties are relatively 
quicker and easier and appear to be more profitable. The unconventional oil and 
gas, such as oil sand, shale oil and shale gas, is bringing a revolution to the entire 
industry. Firms from various regions have a chance to integrate resources by 
conducting mergers and acquisitions. 
There are several unique characteristics in this industry. First of all, while the 
value of an O&G firm is largely dependent on the properties and working 
interests it owns, a value firm with lower market to book ratio is expected to 
benefit the investors more since several papers, such as Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) and Bloomfield and Michaely (2004), indicate that a higher market to 
book ratio is usually accompanied by overestimation of the past performance of a 
firm. In turn, we should observe that the value acquirer outperform the glamour 
acquirer in M&As. 
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Moreover, oil and gas are commodities and it is relatively simple to integrate 
the production after M&As. Therefore, synergies gains can be more easily 
identified. The headquarters of the oil and gas firms are generally clustered in 
specified cities and regions. The geographical proximity of headquarters will 
promote the spread of soft information, resulting in a higher synergy. Yet, the cost 
reduction is subject to the geographical proximity of properties. Furthermore, 
idiosyncratic risk, target public status, method of payment and macro economy 
are also expected to have impacts on M&As in the oil and gas industry.  
In this paper, we explore the determinants of mergers and acquisitions in the oil 
and gas industry via both a large sample analysis and three out-of-sample case 
analyses. In addition, case studies help us to highlight several unique 
characteristics, such as toehold structure and collar consideration structure, in 
different transactions. 
In order to get a better understanding of mergers and acquisitions in the oil and 
gas industry in the United States and Canada, we examine a ten-year sample, from 
2002 to 2011, of mergers and acquisitions, extracted from Thomson Financial’s 
Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. We set the beginning of our 
sample in 2002 as the fifth merger wave ended after a recession in 2001 (Gaughan 
(2010) and Lipton (2006)). During the fifth merger wave, investors were seeking 
cross-border deals. Several of those were accompanied by corporate governance 
problem and dot-com bubble. We have attempted to observe the motivations of 
modern mergers and acquisitions under a relatively sound corporate governance 
environment. 
The other important reason is that qualified combined firms could select 
different accounting methods for a merger before 2002, either the pooling-of-
interest method or the purchase method. Those two competing accounting 
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methods would lead to distinct net income and cash flow for the same merger 
(Misund et al. (2008)). Specifically, the purchase method would decrease the 
initial net income but increase the future net income because of tax deductible 
depreciation. So, the earnings per share were depressed in purchase method. It 
would have an impact on manager’s decision if the compensation of that manager 
is based on earning (Carleton et al. (1983)). Carleton et al. (1983) also explained 
that only an exchange of stock had the possibility to be classified as pooling when 
it met twelve specific conditions set forth in APB Opinion Number 16. Although 
it was not easy to qualify as pooling, one of the largest mergers in the oil and gas 
industry, ExxonMobil deal from 1998 to 1999, was structured on a pooling of 
interests basis. Since the pooling method is no longer used, we start our sample 
from 2002. Accordingly, by starting our sample in 2002, we do not need to 
consider the effect of the choice of accounting methods on M&As in the oil and 
gas industry. 
We end our sample in 2011 due to the limited access to Canadian Financial 
Markets Research Centre (CFMRC) database. But the ten-year time interval is 
long enough to encompass both upward and downward trends in oil price. An 
event study is employed to observe the M&As’ effect on acquirers’ performance, 
followed by two logistic regressions. The first one is used to model the probability 
of deal completion and the second one is used to test whether there is an 
illiquidity issue among low-priced stocks. Several multivariate regressions are 
used to evaluate the relationship between different factors on the acquirer’s 
abnormal return. 
Finally, three out-of-sample case studies, one from Canada and two from the 
United States occurring between 2012 and 2013, are conducted to provide an in-
depth examination of M&A motivations and connections between firms following  
the approach of Aktas et al. (2013). We examine recent deals in order to evaluate 
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our conclusions from our large sample model. In spite of each case being unique, 
it is important to examine individual cases as we can discover firm specific details 
missed in the large sample, which makes our study more empirical. For instance, 
we are able to inspect the production information and interconnections between 
participating firms in each case. Also, our case studies offer us some insights into 
the role of M&As in reorganization and corporate governance. Many connections 
among firms and relationships between managements are discovered in the case 
study. The awareness of those interrelationships can help us to have a better 
understanding of the real world of M&As. It is not merely about the abnormal 
return in the short term. 
Figure 2: The dependence trend of US net oil import since 1949 
 
Reprint from: US: Data focus - It's oil history (2013, October 29). The Economist Intelligence 
Unit.  
 
This paper also contributes to the literature on mergers and acquisitions in the 
Canadian market. The United States has been targeted as the traditional customer 
of Canadian oil and natural gas products for many years. The net oil import 
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dependence, however, has changed a lot during the past decades: demand 
declined and production expanded in the United States. As presented in Figure 2, 
the US net oil import dependence reached the peak in 2005 and dropped during 
the economic crisis period which is attributable to the decreasing demand. Despite 
the demands recovery after the crisis, the oil import dependence has diminished 
because of the development of unconventional oil and gas sources within the U.S. 
This shift in U.S. demand has forced Canada to expand its export market 
beyond the North America in order to grow into an energy superpower. We 
hypothesize that the Canadian oil and gas firms will conduct more cross-border 
deals as an approach to increase their market share overseas. Furthermore, the 
bargaining power of the Canadian hydrocarbon industry is limited as it usually 
price the crude oil according to the WTI price, although Canada has the 3rd 
largest proven oil reserves and is the 6th largest oil producer. Consequently, we 
expect that the overall abnormal return gained from the oil and gas M&As in 
Canada is less compared with the United States. Moreover, there is an 
environmental concern over extraction techniques of Canadian oil sands, which 
constrains the development of unconventional oil and gas. As a result, the deal 
volume in Canada may be lower than which in the U.S. 
Nevertheless, we know that the Canadian firms did well in the past. For 
instance, Eckbo (1986) found acquirers and targets listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange earn a significant excess return on average. Then, he supported the 
productive efficiency theory about horizontal mergers in both U.S. and Canada, 
and the Canadian acquirers perform even better in non-horizontal mergers. In 
addition, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) found that Canadian bidder outperformed 
American bidders in Canadian domestic merger. Andre et al. (2004), in contrast, 
suggested that the post-performance of the Canadian bidders is not good; 
especially they observed a significant underperformance of the glamour firms. 
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Thus, it is valuable to take a look at how Canadian market is functioning. 
Furthermore, not many papers published after 1980s focus on the oil and gas 
industry. The lasting impression of the O&G industry was made by a few of 
classical papers such as Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1988). The industry 
structure and macro economy, however, are distinctive from 1980s. Most of 
current papers on M&As in the oil and gas industry focus on the impact of the 
accounting fundamentals, especially in case studies such as Weston (2002), 
Neubecker and Stadler (2003), Salama et al. (2003). This thesis brings us some 
new ideas regarding the firm and deal characteristics of M&As in the oil and gas 
industry by focusing on the market impact of different deal characteristics. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: literature review and hypotheses 
are stated in the next section. The third section presents the fabric of global 
market in the oil and gas industry and provides our data collection procedure. The 
methodology is described in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses our 
results and the sixth section considers alternative event windows. The three case 
studies are reported in section seven. Conclusion and further research are in 
sections eight and nine. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The common view of the oil and gas industry emerged after several classical 
papers published in 1980s. The O&G firm has been portrayed as a cash flow 
machine which will undertake overinvestment and fail in diversification 
programs, and is associated with a severe corporate governance problem. Jensen 
(1986) explained the free cash flow theory via several takeover examples in the 
oil industry. He also referred to, McConnell and Muscarella (1986) and Picchi 
(1985), to support his statement that the Exploration and Development (E&D) 
expenditure does not bring extra return to the shareholder. Shleifer and Vishny 
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(1988) hypothesized that non-value-maximizing M&As in the oil and gas industry 
were conducted due to a lack of internal control. However, that is only part of the 
story. 
We cannot ignore the fact that the crude oil prices surged from 1973 to the late 
1970’s (Jensen (1986)) and that the oil and gas industry accumulated great wealth 
throughout a consistent and steady growth during the seven-year interval. This is 
the cause of the large amount of free cash flow existing in the oil and gas 
companies during 1980s. Although there is a surge of crude oil prices in our 
sample period as shown in Figure 3, it only lasted for roughly three years and 
became rather volatile after the economic crisis in 2008. Given the very different 
oil price experienced in the 2000’s, we expect to observe different deal 
characteristics and consequences in our sample compared to those in 1980s. 
Figure 3: The historical WTI Crude Oil Spot Price from 1986 to 2014 
 




Three main motivations of mergers and acquisitions are mentioned in the 
existing literature. First, value maximization drives M&As, in spite of the concern 
about the agency problem that “bad” managers will maximize the firm size by 
over expansion which would hurt shareholder’s welfare. Malatesta (1983) 
observed that acquiring firms suffered a wealth loss in both short-term and long-
term before the approval of the merger. However, Moeller et al. (2005) found that 
a small portion of large loss deals would destroy the acquiring firm shareholders’ 
wealth. A value maximizing firm will invest in a project which can increase its 
market power, or in other words, generate positive net present value. Asquith et 
al. (1983) provided evidence that the acquiring firm’s CAR is significantly 
positively related to the relative size
2
 of the target and the bidder in general, 
which supported the value maximizing hypothesis. Apart from increasing market 
power, Neubecker and Stadler (2003) suggested that the combined firm has more 
financial power so that it could seek more investment possibilities. Moreover, 
they stated that the political influence of the acquirer firm improves by obtaining 
more lobbying power. Privately owned acquirers (opposite to Government-owned 
corporations) with stronger political influence could have a better access towards 
the developments and constructions of the pipelines which is crucial for the oil 
and gas company. Weston et al. (1999) added that the antitrust concern does not 
play a role in the oil and gas transactions by examining the change of Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) after the five major mergers completed in the United 
States petroleum industry. Their result suggested that the HHI is far from the 
critical level even after the mergers, since the oil and gas industry is large enough 
to digest the effect of mergers initiated by large firms. The industry report from 
IBISWorld also suggested the market share concentration is low in the oil and gas 
                                                 
2
 The relative size equals the target’s market value divided by the bidder’s market value. 
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exploration industry. All in all, we expect that the large target contributes more to 
the acquirer’s CAR in the oil and gas industry, leading to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The target size will be positively related to acquirer’s 
performance at the deal announcement. 
Geographical proximity, the second motivation, will generate higher acquirer 
return based on Uysal et al. (2008). First of all, cost will be reduced when acquirer 
and target are close to each other, so synergy gain could be higher by sharing 
common facility and human resources better. Secondly, the transmission of 
information is more transparent in local deals. Specifically, soft information can 
help acquirer to identify less obvious synergies and to increase the possibility of 
winning the bid. Kang and Kim (2008) developed the explanation of this local 
bias from another perspective: they found that block acquirers
3
 show strong 
preferences for geographically proximate targets. Geographically proximate 
acquirers would take more active corporate governance actions towards targets 
after acquisitions, because the monitoring costs, such as communication cost and 
governance-related transaction cost, tend to decrease if targets are closer to 
acquirers. Notably, those two papers defined the local deal based on the distance 
between acquirer and target’s headquarters. The headquarters of the oil and gas 
firms traditionally cluster in several cities such as Oklahoma City, the United 
States or Calgary, Canada. The cost synergy may be more influenced by the 
actual distance between properties in the oil and gas M&As. However, due to data 
limitations, we will stay in line with previous literature in hypothesis 2 and focus 
on the geographical proximity of headquarters. We will examine the role of 
property proximity in the case studies. 
                                                 
3
 The block acquirer initially hold less than 5% of the target’s shares and then purchases more than 
5% but less than 50% of the target’s shares. 
11 
 
Hypothesis 2: The geographical proximity of acquirer and target will be 
positively related to the acquirer’s performance at the deal announcement. 
Almazan et al. (2010) presented that firms located in the industry cluster
4
 
usually maintain lower leverage and higher cash flow. Higher growth 
opportunities synchronize with severe competitions in the industry clusters. In 
order to seize the acquisition opportunities, acquirers located in the industry 
cluster need sufficient capital to demonstrate their buying power. Namely, they 
have strong currency to complete the deal. Since the geographic concentration is a 
nature of the oil and gas industry, it is easily to have our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirers who have lower leverage will perform better within 
industry cluster. 
The last common observation is that a horizontal merger usually contributes 
positively to the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return. By studying challenged 
horizontal merger, Eckbo (1983) found that the bidders, targets and rivals in 
challenged mergers (by the Federal Trade Commission or the Antitrust Division 
of the Justice Department) performed better due to the potential of cost-savings, 
whereas the non-challenged horizontal merger does not have a significant 
contribution to bidder’s CAR. In later research, Eckbo (1986) found that there is 
no significant distinction between Canadian horizontal and non-horizontal M&As. 
However, Fee and Shawn (2004) found significantly positive abnormal returns of 
American bidders at deal announcement, originating from the development of 
productive efficiency and the improvement of buying power (also see DeLong 
(2001)). Seth (1990) argued that related acquisition does not outperform unrelated 
acquisition on average in both the CAR measure and synergy score measure. Two 
                                                 
4
 The industry cluster is made up of interconnected firms and institutions which are geographically 
concentrated in particular locations. 
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different typologies, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Porter, were 
used in her analysis and led to the same results. She commented that the source of 
synergy varies in different types of acquisitions. From the views above, we know 
that the country difference and the different typologies of horizontal, vertical and 
unrelated merger will have a strong impact on the sign and significance level of 
bidder’s CAR. As we specify one industry in our study and firms in this industry 
seldom conduct unrelated deals, we anticipate an insignificant correlation between 
the acquirer’s CAR and the horizontal transaction but we will include it in the 
logistic regression as a control variable. 
We add the market to book ratio also as a control variable in order to capture 
the effect of acquirer’s performance before the deal announcement. Fama and 
French (1992) found a positive relationship between book to market ratio, a 
measure of the distress risk, and the expected stock returns (also see Lewellen 
(1999)) and established their famous three-factor model by recognizing the book 
to market ratio as a common risk factor. Alternatively, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
argued that a high market to book ratio is originally from the overestimate the past 
performance of the glamour firm. They found a long-term underperformance of 
bidders with high market to book ratio. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also found 
that the group of high O-score
5
 firms includes more firms with high market to 
book ratio, which suggested that there is a mispricing problem. In addition, 
Bloomfield and Michaely (2004) surveyed 25 senior analysts with a mean 
working experience of 9.8 years and reported that the firm with higher market to 
book ratio received significantly lower expected returns and were considered to 
be riskier and overpriced. As noted, we believe that higher market to book ratio 
indicates larger possibility of overpricing, which leads to hypothesis 4. 
                                                 
5
 O-score is a proxy of distress risk. A higher O-score indicates a higher likelihood of bankruptcy. 
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Hypothesis 4: The market to book ratio will be negatively related to acquirer’s 
performance at the deal announcement. 
We also hypothesize size and geographic proximity effects are positively 
associated with the deal completion rate. And a value firm with lower market to 
book ratio will has a higher probability of completing the transaction. In addition, 
we assume that penny stocks will have a lower deal completion rate. 
Hypothesis 5: A lower MB ratio of acquirer, acquiring larger target, 
conducting a local deal, making a horizontal merger or a non-penny stock 
acquirer will raise the probability of deal completion. 
It is essential to examine whether there is an illiquidity issue with respect to 
penny stocks. We need to separate the penny stocks if they are more illiquid 
stocks since their lower trading frequency will reduce accuracy of our estimation. 
Moreover, the low-priced firms are expected to have higher idiosyncratic risk. 
Morck et al. (2000) found a higher level of stock return synchronicity in the 
emerging markets due to the lack of protection of firm’s private information. 
Namely, firms with more revelation of private information have lower 
idiosyncratic volatilities. It is easier for low-priced firm to keep firm-specific 
information from the public since they receive relatively less analyst coverage, 
which lead to our sixth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of being a penny stock is positively correlated 
with illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk after controlling for acquirer’s market to 
book ratio and leverage. 
The idiosyncratic risk will be related to the uncertainty of acquirer’s 
performance, especially in deals involving stock payment. In addition, Ferreira 
and Laux (2007) found that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions face more 
14 
 
idiosyncratic risk. In particular, the risk is significantly negatively correlated with 
GIM index
6
, a measure of corporate governance. So, we expect that the 
idiosyncratic risk of acquirers will decrease their CAR in hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 7: The idiosyncratic risk will be negatively related to the acquirer’s 
performance at the deal announcement. 
Some factors that could affect acquirer’s performance after the deal 
announcement are also taken into consideration. There is substantial evidence that 
takeover premiums both for bidders and targets are highly related to the payment 
method. In studies of U.S. market, Jensen (1986) predicted that the payment of 
cash and debt is expected to benefit acquirers compared with stock exchange. 
Travlos (1987) supported Jensen’s hypothesis. He found that offers involving 
stock payment, on average, result significant negative abnormal returns relative to 
cash payment. However, the impacts may differ in different nations. Eckbo et al. 
(1990) found that Canadian bidders who paid by a mixture of cash and stock 
gained a higher premium. Therefore, we get the eighth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: The stock payment will be negatively related to the U.S. 
acquirer’s performance after deal announcement, whereas the combined payment 
will be positively related to Canadian acquirer’s performance at the deal 
announcement. 
The public status of target is hypothesized to influence the market expectation 
towards the deal. Officer (2007) found an average acquisition discount for private 
targets and subsidiaries of 15% to 30% compared to comparable public targets. 
The acquirer is assumed to bid lower due to the uncertainty of target-valuation 
                                                 
6
 The GIM index is invented by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick in their NBER Working Paper No. 
8449.  This index contains 24 different provisions related to corporate governance. A higher GIM 
index indicates a poorer corporate governance. 
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and constraint on target’s corporate liquidity. Under such conditions, market 
would react positively towards private acquisition. Accordingly, we would expect 
a positive acquirer cumulative abnormal return if the target is private, shown in 
hypothesis 9. 
Hypothesis 9: Acquirers who purchase private targets will gain greater CAR 
after controlling for size difference, acquirer’s market to book ratio, and 
geographical proximity. 
3. Data 
3.1. Global Market Structure 
The initial sample consists of all M&As related to the oil and gas industry 
regardless of country between 2002 and 2011 as recorded in the SDC database, in 
order to have an overall view of M&A activity during the ten-year time period in 
the hydrocarbon industry. In this sample, our two screens are the availability of 
the deal value and that at least one of the firms in the mergers is from the oil and 
gas industry sector. There are 2,533 mergers conducted by the U.S. bidders out of 
a total of 9,598 mergers. The construction of our initial sample is shown in Tables 
1 and 2. 
Table 1: Top 5 Industry Sector 
This table exhibits the most active acquirer and target industries of oil and gas M&As between 2002 and 2011. We 
separate our initial sample into two parts. Panel A contains 8,024 deals in which targets are from the oil and gas industry 
and reports the top 5 acquirer industries. Panel B contains 6,736 deals in which acquirers are from the oil and gas industry 
and reports the top 5 target industries. Notably, we count the number of O&G target and the number of O&G acquirer 
based on deals. Since our initial sample contains all forms of deal, including acquisition of assets, it means a single firm 
can be counted more than once if it shows in several transactions. 
Panel A: Who Buys O&G Targets? 
Acquirer's Industry Sector No. of O&G Target % 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 5162 64% 
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges 1532 19% 
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 262 3% 
Mining 254 3% 
Business Services 106 1% 
Total Number of O&G Target 8024  
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Panel B: Who Do O&G Acquirers Buy? 
Target's Industry Sector No. of O&G Acquirer % 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 5162 77% 
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 310 5% 
Mining 272 4% 
Business Services 158 2% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 108 2% 
Total Number of O&G Acquirer 6736  
 
For those who buy the oil and gas firms or assets, 19% of acquirers are from 
the investment and commodity industries, while 64% of acquirers are from the oil 
and gas industry (Table 1 Panel A). This indicates that some firms from other 
industry tend to invest in the oil and gas industry. In Table 1 Panel B, we see that 
77% of the oil and gas firms choose to invest in targets from same industry as 
themselves. The other four industries from the top-five target industries of the oil 
and gas firms are “electric, gas, and water distribution”, “mining”, “business 
services”, and “chemicals and allied products”, all of which display a strong 
relationship towards the oil and gas industry. For example, they acquired natural 
gas transmission and distribution companies which belong to “electric, gas, and 
water distribution” and subsidiaries of the oil and gas firms which belong to 
“business services”. We could know that the acquirers from the oil and gas 
industry prefer to make a horizontal transaction rather than conduct a 
conglomerate deal, which remains the same if we only consider merger and 
acquisition of majority interest. Note that the preference of horizontal M&As 
varies from country to country and over years. Eckbo (1992) found that the oil 
and gas extraction industry has a higher frequency of horizontal mergers during 
1963 to 1981 in the United States, 81.6%, than the average, 73.7%. As for the 
Canadian market in the same period, the number of the O&G industry, 68.6%, is 
outstanding from the average, 56.6%. (See Appendix A.1 for reprint of table). Our 
result is consistent with Eckbo (1992). 
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Table 2: Top 5 Nation Sector 
This table exhibits the most active nation where the oil and gas M&As happened over the period 2002-2011. We 
separate our initial sample into two parts. Columns 2 and 3 shows top 5 acquirer nation among 6,736 deals in which 
acquirers are from the oil and gas industry. Columns 4 and 5 shows top 5 target nation among 8,024 deals in which targets 
are from the oil and gas industry. Notably, we count the number of O&G target and the number of O&G acquirer based on 
deals. Since our initial sample contains all forms of deal, including acquisition of assets, it means a single firm can be 
counted more than once if it shows in several transactions. In addition, the deal may or may not be domestic since a 
Canadian bidder does not necessarily acquire a Canadian target. 
Number of Deals Acquirer Nation % Target Nation % 
Canada 2083 31% 2291 29% 
United States 1953 29% 2501 31% 
Australia 509 8% 644 8% 
United Kingdom 412 6% 322 4% 
China 241 4% 209 3% 
 
Table 2 reveals that both top 5 acquirer and target nations are United States, 
Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, and China, meaning that 1 of the participants 
(the acquirer or the target) is from the countries mentioned above. It is mainly 
because those countries have abundant natural resources. The Middle East, a 
region rich in oil, does not appear as it encompasses many small countries. The 
reason Russia does not appear in our top-five is that it’s M&A activity has 
dramatically increased in the past two years. We focus on the 6,736 transactions 
where the acquirers are from the oil and gas industry. 
Table 3: Form of Deal Made by O&G Acquirer 
This table reports the deal forms in the subsample which only contains deals conducted by O&G acquirer. Notably, we 
count the number of acquirer and target based on deals. Since our subsample contains all forms of deal, including 
acquisition of assets, it means a single firm can be counted more than once if it shows in several transactions. 
Form of Deal Number of Deals % 
Merger 1703 25% 
Acq. of Majority Interest 778 12% 
Acq. of Remaining Interest 269 4% 
Acq. of Partial Interest 119 2% 
Acq. of Assets 1146 17% 
Acq. of Certain Assets 2211 33% 
Acquisition 2 0% 
Buyback 503 7% 




Table 3 indicates that only 37% of deals are mergers and acquisitions of 
majority interest, whereas 50% of deals are assets acquisition (the sum of Row 5 
and Row 6). During our sample period, 2002-2011, there are 189,693 transactions 
from all industries with available deal value in the SDC database. Twenty nine 
percent of them, 54,895 transactions, are asset acquisitions. So, we could infer 
that certain properties will be more appealed to the oil and gas investors. We 
focus on the transactions involving a change of corporate control in order to test 
the synergy gains at the corporate level. Therefore, we only include mergers and 
acquisitions of majority interest, 2,481 transactions, in our next table. 
Table 4: Public Status of Acquirer and Target in Deals Made by O&G 
Acquirer 
This table shows the public status of both acquirer and target in the subsample which only contains mergers and 
acquisitions of majority of interest conducted by an O&G acquirer. Notably, we count the number of acquirer and target 
based on deals. A single acquirer can be counted more than once if it shows in several transactions. 
 Number of Deals 
 Acquirer % Target % 
Government 15 1% 22 1% 
Joint Venture 28 1% 95 4% 
Private 224 9% 995 40% 
Public 1899 77% 646 26% 
Subsidiary 315 13% 723 29% 
 
Table 4 shows that the majority of acquirers are public firms, whereas targets 
are relatively evenly distributed between public firms, private firms and 
subsidiaries. As it is hard to get corporate information for the non-public firms, 
we will focus on public acquirers only in the following study. 
3.2. North American Deals 
From above section, we know that, in the past ten years, M&As in the O&G 
industry tend to occur in countries with abundant oil and gas resources, especially 
in Canada and the United States. The O&G firms are more likely to conduct asset 
acquisitions than acquisitions of majority interests and are more likely to make 
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acquisitions in related industries. Those acquirers engaged in transactions 
including the change of corporate control are primarily public firms and willing to 
invest in private, public and subsidiary target. As a result, we will focus on the 
United States and Canadian public acquirers who make either acquisitions of 
majority interest or mergers in the oil and gas industry. 
The imposition of those constraints of firm and deal characteristics, results in 
1,220 transactions. Eight hundred and thirty-eight transactions are from Canada 
and 382 transactions are from the United States. Control variables, such as 
contraction, percentage change of crude oil futures price, percentage change of 
natural gas futures price, lagged GDP and lagged energy production, are also 
included in the study. The U.S. business cycle data is obtained from the NBER 
website (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Bloomberg provides the 
WTI Generic 1st crude oil futures price (CL1) and Generic 1st natural gas futures 
price (NG1). GDP and the energy production of U.S. and Canada are obtained 
from the World Bank website (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
In order to collect the fundamental information of the acquirers from 
Compustat database, we employ the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database and CFMRC database to extract the United States firm’s 8-digit 
CUSIP and Canadian firm’s 9-digit CUSIP respectively. Then, we merge this 
information back to our SDC sample, which reduces our number of transactions 
to 243 for U.S. and 271 for Canada. In addition, an acquirer firm sometimes will 
announce more than one acquisition on the same day. The double counting event 
would change the weighted effect of explanatory variables. In those cases, we 
only keep the deal with largest transaction value as the larger deal is assumed to 
have more impact on the market. Thus, 10 deals are dropped. The 8-digit CUSIPs 
of the remainder, 504 deals, are imported into Compustat. 
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Next, we merge the SDC sample with the Compustat outcomes, which returns 
us 375 deals in total. To calculate the market to book ratio, we obtain the current 
closing price of acquirers from CRSP and CFMRC dated as of one trading day 
before deal announcement. We also extract the daily closing spot exchange rate 
expressed as Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar from CFMRC. It is used to convert 
the Canadian dollar value variables from Compustat into U.S. dollar value 
variables. There are 330 deals left after eliminating the deals without stock price 
on or before the announcement date and the deals which market to book ratios are 
negative. Moreover, if the acquirer and the target are from the same city, we will 
define the deal as a local deal. Although we can get acquirers’ city from both SDC 
and Compustat database, targets’ city is not completely listed in SDC database. 
So, we look up the missing value of targets’ city through Factiva business news 
and Capital IQ. However, it is impossible to check every target’s city because 
several of them are undisclosed private company. We set those firms’ city as 
Unknown.  
Subsequently, Eventus software is utilized to perform an event study of the 
United States firms, whereas SAS programming is utilized to calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of Canadian firms. We check whether the 
announcement date is a CRSP trading day. If not, we adjust the announcement 
date in the request file to the first CRSP trading day after the deal announcement. 
EVENTUS returns 173 results out of 180 inputs. The six dropped events do not 
have sufficient data to estimate the parameters since we require a minimum of 30 
days of trading in the estimation window. The Canadian analysis returns 144 
results out of 150 inputs. 
In summary, our final sample contains 317 deals with complete data from 
above procedures. One hundred and seventy-three deals are from United States 
and 144 deals are from Canada. The final sample size is not large, however it is 
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reasonable as we only selected one industry’s mergers and acquisitions 
throughout the ten-year period. The structure of the final sample is shown in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1: Sample Description by Year 
This table displays the number and percentage of complete deals, horizontal deals, local deals, deals involving public 
target, 100% stock payment deals, deals conducted by low-priced firm and by illiquid firm in our final sample, reported by 
year. Local denotes the deals in which the headquarters of acquirer and the target are located in the same city. Penny stock 
denotes the deals in which the acquirer’s closing price of the day before deal announcement less than $5. Illiquid stock 
denotes the deals in which the acquirer’s usable returns from estimation window less than 120  in the U.S. subsample or 
usable returns from estimation window less than 100  in the Canadian subsample. 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
N Obs 23 23 26 36 39 38 43 27 27 35 317 
Complete 18 21 24 33 36 34 35 25 27 29 282 
% of Year Obs 78% 91% 92% 92% 92% 89% 81% 93% 100% 83% 89% 
Horizontal 19 17 20 29 26 30 29 18 15 20 223 
% of Year Obs 83% 74% 77% 81% 67% 79% 67% 67% 56% 57% 70% 
Local 10 7 7 16 13 16 13 16 12 12 122 
% of Year Obs 43% 30% 27% 44% 33% 42% 30% 59% 44% 34% 38% 
Public Target 14 7 12 12 16 15 17 10 9 12 124 
% of Year Obs 61% 30% 46% 33% 41% 39% 40% 37% 33% 34% 39% 
100% Stock Pay 2 2 4 5 11 3 7 6 9 6 55 
% of Year Obs 9% 9% 15% 14% 28% 8% 16% 22% 33% 17% 17% 
Penny Stock 8 0 3 6 7 7 15 15 3 4 68 
% of Year Obs 35% 0% 12% 17% 18% 18% 35% 56% 11% 11% 21% 
Illiquid Stock 4 0 3 8 3 7 5 5 2 4 41 
% of Year Obs 17% 0% 12% 22% 8% 18% 12% 19% 7% 11% 13% 
 
From Table 5.1, we see that the oil and gas industry M&As underwent a 
remarkable change throughout the ten-year period. The deal volume was 
increasing during the first seven-year interval, reaching a peak, 43 deals, in 2008. 
This is consistent with PwC’s annual report about O&G deals (PwC., Oil & gas 
deals: 2008 annual review), indicating that the total deal number increased 
relative to the number in 2007. The volume kept shrinking after the financial 
crisis and subsequently recovered in 2011. The tendency of complete deals was 
the same as total deals, whereas the percentage of complete deal was extremely 
high in 2009 and 2010, 93% and 100% respectively. This fact indicates a slowing 
momentum presented as the deal volume decreases but the complete rate 
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increases during the business contraction. One possible explanation is that 
acquirers become more prudent in a cold market, so they review the transactions 
in a more cautious and conscious way to ensure their benefits from M&As. On the 
targets side, they are more likely to accept acquirer’s bid without a hard bargain. 
Acquirers’ willingness to conduct a horizontal merger or to acquire a public target 
fell off, and there are not many 100% stock payment deals throughout the ten-year 
period. Moreover, the proportion of local deals, low-priced acquirer deals and 
illiquid acquirer deals were relatively large in 2009, compared to other years in 
the sample period. 
Table 5.2: Sample Description by Nation 
This table displays the number and percentage of complete deals, horizontal deals, local deals, deals involving public 
target, 100% stock payment deals, deals conducted by low-priced firm and by illiquid firm in our final sample, reported by 
nation. A z-test is employed to verify the significance of differences in proportions, U.S. minus Canada. The z-statistics are 
shown in the last column. 
 United States % Canada % Diff. of % z-test 
N Obs 173  144    
Complete 147 85% 135 94% -9% -2.483** 
Horizontal 113 65% 110 76% -11% -2.148** 
Local 28 16% 94 65% -49% -8.944*** 
Public Target 54 31% 70 49% -17% -3.160*** 
100% Stock Payment 20 12% 35 24% -13% -2.983*** 
Penny Stock 26 15% 42 29% -14% -3.053*** 
Illiquid stock 14 8% 27 19% -11% -2.815*** 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
We divide our sample into two subsamples according to acquirer’s nationality 
in Table 5.2. The completion rate is significant higher in Canada than in the 
United States. In addition, the Canadian acquirers intend to invest in horizontal 
deal, local target and public target than the U.S. acquirers. Especially, the 
difference of local deal proportion, 49%, is significant at the 1% level.  A 
limitation for Canadian bidders is that the location of the nature resources is 
mainly in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Particularly, the headquarters of most 
Canadian oil corporations are located in Calgary, explaining why there are a large 
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number of local deals in Canada. In addition, Canadian bidders are twice as likely 
to use 100% stock to acquire, although there are more illiquid and low price stock 
in the Canadian market. 
A summary of variable definitions can be found in Appendix A.2. The 
acquirer’s characteristics are provided in Table 6.1. We also test the differences, 
U.S. minus Canada, in means and medians for each variable, shown in Table 6.2. 
Then sample distribution classed by penny stock is presented in Appendix A.3.1 
and Appendix A.3.2. 
Table 6.1: Sample Distribution 
This table presents our final sample distribution of numerical variables, including minimum, lower quartile, median, 
upper quartile, maximum, mean and standard deviation, categorized by acquirer’s nationality. Sizediff represents the size 
difference between acquirer and target scaled by acquirer’s size. MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. 
Acquirer size represents the log of market value of total assets in the year-end before announcement. Leverage represents 
the acquirer’s total liability divided by its book equity. Idiosyn represents the idiosyncratic risk of acquirer. AdjRsq is 
obtained from the event study of acquirer. 
Acq. Nation Variable N Obs Min 25% Median 75% Max Mean Std Dev 
Entire Sizediff* 317 -5.77 0.57 0.86 0.96 1.00 0.64 0.64 
Market MB_ratio 317 0.14 1.51 2.05 2.90 36.03 2.70 2.94 
 Acquirer size 317 1.48 5.41 6.57 8.05 12.89 6.75 2.14 
 Leverage 317 0.01 0.51 0.92 1.34 42.96 1.24 2.54 
 Idiosyn 307 -1.31 0.94 1.70 2.70 10.20 2.01 1.70 
 AdjRsq 317 -0.02 0.04 0.15 0.27 0.79 0.18 0.18 
Canada Sizediff* 144 -3.67 0.54 0.82 0.96 1.00 0.62 0.62 
 MB_ratio 144 0.14 1.33 1.74 2.42 36.03 2.28 3.30 
 Acquirer size 144 1.48 4.96 6.01 7.50 10.45 6.24 1.99 
 Leverage 144 0.01 0.40 0.62 1.02 2.94 0.77 0.58 
 Idiosyn 144 -1.31 1.06 1.98 3.08 10.20 2.33 1.90 
 AdjRsq 144 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.79 0.16 0.17 
United Sizediff* 173 -5.77 0.59 0.87 0.96 1.00 0.66 0.65 
States MB_ratio 173 0.35 1.71 2.36 3.47 20.02 3.04 2.57 
 Acquirer size 173 2.04 6.06 6.93 8.26 12.89 7.17 2.17 
 Leverage 173 0.01 0.85 1.16 1.65 42.96 1.62 3.35 
 Idiosyn 163 -1.27 0.80 1.54 2.38 6.18 1.73 1.46 
 AdjRsq 173 -0.02 0.06 0.16 0.30 0.78 0.20 0.18 
* Larger number of Sizediff represents smaller deal. The negative minimum number is due to 





Table 6.2: Difference in means and medians 
This table presents the differences, U.S. minus Canada, in means and medians, categorized by variables from Table 6.1. 
We use a t-test to examine the significance of differences in means and a Wilcoxon two-sample test to examine the 
significance of differences in medians. The p-values of the t-test and the Wilcoxon two-sample test are shown in the 
brackets. 
Variable Diff. of means P-value Diff. of medians P-value 
Sizediff 0.04 (0.5573) 0.05 (0.2354) 
MB_ratio 0.76** (0.0255) 0.62*** (<.0001) 
Acquirer size 0.93*** (0.0001) 0.92*** (<.0001) 
Leverage 0.85*** (0.0013) 0.54*** (<.0001) 
Idiosyn -0.60*** (0.0025) -0.44*** (0.0031) 
AdjRsq 0.04** (0.0370) 0.05** (0.0241) 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
We conclude that U.S. firms have significant large numbers in most of the 
numerical variables from Table 6.2. Compared with Canadian acquirers in both 
means and medians, there are more glamour acquirers in the United States 
represented by higher market to book ratio. They also have larger firm size and 
higher leverage rate, which are significantly different from Canadian acquirers. 
Yet, the size differences between acquirer and target are almost the same in two 
countries. We see that the Canadian acquirers exposure to higher level of 
idiosyncratic risk. Finally, a larger adjusted r-squared means that the noise from 
the event study model is less in the U.S. subsample. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Event Study Methodology 
The event study method was introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969) to examine how new information influences stock prices. CRSP Value-
weighted returns and CFMRC Daily Value-weighted returns are employed as the 
market index return to estimate the normal returns. Our estimation window is 120 
trading days and ends 46 days before the event date. There is a possibility of 
information leakage before deal announcement, so it is reasonable to end our 
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estimation period at Day -46 to eliminate the effect of unusual stock price change 
before the event announcement. In addition, some firms do not have trading 
activity on the exact announcement date, but we can contain their information by 
selecting a broader event window. Our 5-day event window is from 2 days before 
to 2 days after the event date. We require that the acquirer has sufficient trading 
data, at least 30 trading days, to estimate the coefficients. 
We have to admit, however, that there are some limitations associated with 
event study method. Firstly, according to MacKinlay (1997), the power of event 
study is limited in long interval since we cannot assume that the long-term 
expected return is zero. To avoid this problem, we will only use the methodology 
for short term estimation. Secondly, we should not neglect that only selecting one 
industry may affect the independence of events. However, our events are scattered 
during the 10-year time period, which would help the independence of events. 
Moreover, standard event study is still used in single industry research without 
any adjustments about estimation method. Two recent papers, Akdoğu (2009) and 
Becher et al. (2012), employed the standard event study method to studying the 
telecommunications and utilities industries respectively. Akdoğu (2009) used the 
S&P 500 index as the benchmark of market model with an estimation window 
containing 255 trading days. Becher et al. (2012) used the CRSP value-weighted 
index as the benchmark of market model with an estimation window of 90 trading 
days. Although there are some problems associated with event studies, it is still 
the most broadly and popular used methodology in examining the effect of 
mergers and acquisitions on stock returns. 
The market model is employed herein to measure the market response to new 
events. The historical data in estimation period (-166, -46) is used to estimate the 
parameters in equation (1) for each firm i. 
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                       (1) 
Where 
    = the daily return of firm i at time t; 
   = the intercept of firm i; 
   = the parameter of firm i which indicates the sensitivity of the stock’s return 
to the market’s return; 
    = the market return at time t which is the daily return on the CFMRC Daily 
Value Weighted Index or CRSP Value Weighted Index; 
    = an error term of firm i at time t; 
 
The announcement day of mergers and acquisitions has been deemed as the 
event day, day 0. Then    and   , obtained from estimation window, are used to 
forecast the expected stock return,    ̂    ̂   , on day t. The difference between 
the expected stock return and the actual return which is the abnormal return,     , 
and is attributed to the event: 
           ̂    ̂          (2)  
There are two ways to present the result of the event study. Firstly, we average 
the abnormal returns of all firms to obtain the mean abnormal return for each day, 
shown in equation (3), and then sum the average abnormal returns from Day -40 
to Day 10, shown in equation (4), in order to obtain the cumulative abnormal 
return over the event window (-40, 10). 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
∑     
 
   
 
        (3) 
Where n = the number of firms in each portfolio; 
 
      ∑    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
 
          (4) 
We then conduct a cross sectional analysis in order to evaluate the impact of 
the announcement after controlling for firm, deal and economic factors. We sum 
the abnormal returns of individual firms to obtain the cumulative abnormal return 
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over various event windows shown in equation (5). In the following study, we 
will mainly consider acquirer CAR from event windows (-2, +2). 
      ∑     
 
          (5) 
We compute the Canadian firms’ CAR manually by SAS and export the U.S. 
firms’ CAR easily from EVENTUS. 
4.2. Logistic Test 
We employ two logistic tests. The first one is used to capture the impact of 
size, geographic proximity, diversification effect, acquirer’s past performance and 
low-priced stock on the probability of deal completion. The dummy variable, 
Status, equals 1 when the deal is completed and otherwise equals zero. Sizediff is 
used to measure the size difference between acquirer and target, which is 
calculated by the market value of acquirer minus the transaction value of the deal 
then scaled by the market value of acquirer. Since it is impossible to get all of 
targets’ market value because several of them are privately held firms, the deal 
value is taken as proxy for target firm’s market value according to Uysal et al. 
(2008). This method is reasonable as the acquirer will bid according to the market 
value of target in a healthy market. The market to book ratio, MB ratio, is 
employed to measure market reaction to bidder’s past performance, calculated 
following equation: MB ratio = the closing price one-day before announcement / 
book value per share. The most widely adopted approach to calculate the market-
to-book ratio is from the Fama and French (1993). However, they calculated the 
market value of equity based on the end of December of year t-1 since their 
dependent variable is the monthly return. In our case, we take the stock price on 
the day prior to the deal announcement in order to capture the latest market 
evaluation towards the acquirer. In addition, we include two dummy variables: 
SIC equaling 1 if the target and acquirer are in the same industry (same 4-digit 
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SIC code from SDC), and Geo equaling 1 when target and acquirer headquarters 
are in the same city. We also include a binary variable, Penny Stock, using the 
definition of penny stock from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
that a penny stock is a security trading below $5 per share. This dummy variable 
equals 1 if acquirer’s closing price of the day before deal announcement less than 
$5. The regression model is shown in equation (6). 
       
                                                      (6) 
From Hypothesis 5, we expect a negative relationship between Sizediff and 
Status, which means that the probability of deal completion will increase by 
acquiring a larger target. Also, it is more likely to observe that the acquirer and 
the target are from the same city in a complete deal. We anticipate a negative 
relationship between MB ratio and Status. Namely, value firms with less 
likelihood of mispricing are more likely to complete a deal. The low-priced stock 
firms are expected to have a lower likelihood of completing a deal. 
The second logistic regression is used to identify the characteristics of the 
penny stock. If the low-priced stock will generate a liquidity problem, then we 
need to separate them from the entire sample. We also consider that the acquirer’s 
past performance and financial slack will have an impact on the probability of 
being a penny stock.  
Acquirer’s fundamental, Leverage, is included. The book leverage, equaling 
total liabilities divided by stockholders' book equity, is used to examine whether 
firms with higher level of the financial slack, represented by lower leverage, have 
larger probability of completing a deal. Furthermore, we could take book leverage 
as a proxy of corporate governance. Lower book leverage represents poorer 
governance on the management, leading to more deal completions caused by the 
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manager’s overexpansion without maximizing shareholder’s value. The 
alternative, market leverage, is an inappropriate measurement since the option 
compensation of manager will grow while the market leverage is decrease based 
on Mehran (1992). 
We define the dummy variable, Illiquidity, equals 1 if usable returns from 
estimation window are less than 120 for U.S. firms or usable returns from 
estimation window are less than 100 for Canadian firms. A looser standard for an 
illiquid stock in the Canadian subsample is because there are many more non-
trading observations in the CFMRC database than observed in the U.S. data. The 
idiosyncratic risk, Idiosyn, is used to capture the firm-specific risk of acquirer, 
calculated by the following equation:             
    
  
 . (Hutton et al. (2009)) 
And the    is obtained from the event study. The second logistic regression 
model is presented in equation (7). 
                                                   
                   (7) 
After controlling the MB ratio and Leverage, we expected that the illiquid 
stocks and stocks with more idiosyncratic risk are more likely to be penny stocks 
(Hypothesis 6). 
4.3. Cross-sectional analysis 
In this section, we model the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal return, ACAR, as 
a function of the previously applied explanatory variables to test Hypothesis 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 7. Then, we add several new independent variables to test Hypotheses 8 
and 9. 
In hypothesis 8, we expect that the method of payment will influence acquirer’s 
CAR differently in the U.S. and Canadian subsamples. Dummy variable, Stock, 
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equals 1 when the payment is 100% stock exchange. The other deal characteristic, 
Target public, equals 1 when the target firm is a public firm and is used to test 
Hypothesis 9. Koeplin et al. (2000) found a significant private target discount. An 
interaction term, Stock*Target public, is also included in order to verify Officer 
(2009)’s finding. He reported that the acquirers will receive higher returns if they 
pay stock when the target volatility is high. It can also bring us insight into 
whether a bidder who acquirers a private target in same city has a higher 
possibility to gain more. 
Percentage change of CL1 is the indicator of crude oil futures price. We expect 
that the future price would provide us forecast information regarding the 
hydrocarbon industry. In addition, Chinn et al. (2005) mentioned that the futures 
price of crude oil is an unbiased predictor of the spot price. We anticipate that the 
futures prices, as control variables, are positively correlated with the acquirer’s 
CAR. Although CL1 commodity is from the U.S. market, Canadian’s petroleum 
is traded based on the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price. So, it is 
appropriate to apply it to Canadian oil and gas firms as well. 
In addition, several economic factors are considered in our regression model. 
We extract the expansion and contraction period of U.S. economy from National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Our sample contains one business 
contraction period from December 2007 to June 2009. The dummy variable, 
Contraction, equals one when the transaction occurred in the contraction period. 
We expect the acquirer’s performance in stagnant economy period is better than 
the remainder since the acquirer tend to review the deal more cautious and the 
target are less likely to bargain hard. As for variables like GDP and energy 
production, ratios are preferred rather than dollar values because the ratios will 
present the change of economy. We calculate Lagged GDP as        divided by 
       at year t. It is the same for energy production. These variables are used to 
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observe the effect of the past macro economy on the acquirer’s abnormal return. 
The production volume is expected to negatively correlate with the returns of oil 
and gas firms based on Boyer and Filion (2006). However, the adjusted r-squared 
converted to a negative value if we include all of macro-economic factors. We 
only select the Lagged GDP as a representative of the macroeconomy in the 
equation (8). A binary variable, Canada, equals 1 if acquirer is from Canada since 
we combine the low-priced firm together in the penny stock subsample. 
                                                  
                                                      
                                                     
                   (8) 
4.4. Case Study Methodology 
Three out-of-sample case studies are introduced to examine our results from 
large sample analysis and to reveal details lost in large sample. We mainly refer to 
two papers in order to develop our case study approach. Aktas et al. (2013) 
analyzed the interrelationships between bidder, rival and their customers using a 
case study. They presented historical data on their research objects and conducted 
event studies using a market model and the value-weighted CRSP index. An event 
study was also used in Lys and Vincent (1995) to calculate abnormal returns. In 
addition, they used the cumulative abnormal return to compute the acquirer’s total 
wealth loss shown in equation (9). Moreover, fundamentals from the annual 
report in subsequent years are used to verify the market assessment. 
                 
                                                               (9) 
As we can see from Table 6.1, the oil and gas industry in the United States is 
larger than the Canadian industry. In order to make a comparison between our 
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cases, we will choose a Canadian firm with a large deal so that we can find a 
comparable U.S. firm. First, we rank the deal value and select the Crescent Point 
Energy as our Canadian case as it has a fairly large transaction value among all 
Canadian deals. Then, we pick another two US cases in which the acquirers have 
a similar revenue level relative to Crescent Point. LinnCo, LLC and its parent 
firm, Linn Energy, LLC, executed a larger transaction than Crescent Point. 
However, it took them almost a year to complete the deal. As for the other 
American case, the transaction announced by Continental Resources, Inc. has a 
similar deal value to the Canadian deal.  
In our case study, stock price of acquirer is plotted in order to give us a direct 
impression about market reaction towards acquirer’s takeover attempt in the first 
place. Next, we present the historical financial information regarding acquirer 
firms such as total revenue, net incomes, returns on assets, diluted EPS and full 
time employees. Fundamentals in the following year will be presented if 
applicable. Afterwards, we collect merger-related events through three channels: 
(1) Edgar and Sedar for filings and press releases; (2) Factiva for news; (3) S&P 
Capital IQ for fundamentals and connections between firms. An event study is 
conducted to evaluate the acquirer’s performance toward takeover events. We 
chose a short event window, (-2, 2) to make sure no other nonmerger-related 
events are included. 
5. Results of Large Sample Analysis 
5.1. Basic Event Study 
    To obtain the market reaction toward the deal announcement over event 
window, we calculate the mean cumulative abnormal return from Day -40 to Day 
10, classed by acquirer nationality. 
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Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns associated with firm announcement 
(Replicate Appendix A.4) 
The figure below plots mean cumulative abnormal returns for Canadian and U.S. bidders separately over 51-day event 
window from (-40, 10). 
Panel A – U.S. subsample 
 
Panel B – Canadian subsample 
 
 
Referring to the Fig.10 from Betton et al. (2008) in Appendix A.4, the U.S. 
bidders will receive a positive abnormal return if they acquire private target or a 
negative abnormal return if they acquire public target. As shown in Figure 4, we 
observe different patterns of cumulative abnormal returns in the U.S. and 
Canadian subsamples. In general, we observe better performance from the U.S. 
bidder throughout the event window. For bidders’ performance before the deal 
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40 days, whereas the mean CAR of the Canadian bidders seems to be volatile 
around 0. In particular, Panel A shows a pronounced run-up from the U.S. bidder 
who acquires public target in several days before the deal announcement. In the 
following days after the deal announcement, however, those bidders who acquire 
public targets receive negative market responses in both the U.S. and Canadian 
subsamples. In contrast, the stock performance of the bidders who acquire private 
targets maintains an increasing trend after the deal announcement, especially in 
the U.S. subsample. 
We compare our results in the U.S. subsample with Betton et al. (2008) in 
Table 7. A pronounced run-up period is observed in our U.S. subsample since the 
mean CAR in our analysis is significantly larger than their result. We assume that 
a significant run-up is a special characteristic in the oil and gas industry. Yet, we 
do not observe a significant mean CAR at the announcement period (-1, 1). 
Table 7: Results comparisons (the U.S. subsample) 
    This table compares the results from Betton et al. (2008) with the results from our U.S. subsample.  The number of Mean 
CAR and Z-statistics in Betton el al. (2008) is taken from Table 8 Panel D. They include all the U.S. 6,836 transactions 
from 1980 to 2005 in their analysis. Our results include 173 transactions in our U.S. subsample. 
 Betton et al. (2008) Our results 
 (-41, -2) (-1, 1) (-41, -2) (-1, 1) 
Mean CAR 0.50% 0.69% 4.52% 0.26% 
Z-statistics -2.248 -3.886 3.481 -0.319 
 
5.2. Marginal Effects of Deal Completion and Penny Stock 
In this part, we shed some light on what drives a completed deal in the oil and 
gas industry. Those characteristics that are expected to contribute to a positive 
cumulative abnormal return are taken into consideration. In Hypothesis 5, we 
assume that a small size difference between acquirer and target, geographical 
proximity, value firms and non-penny stock firms are more likely to result in 
successful deals. The first logistic regression result is illustrated in Table 8.1 and 
the first logistic model fitness result is displayed in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.1: Logistic Regression of Deal Completion 
This table relates deal characteristics, such as size difference, geographical proximity, horizontal deal, acquirer’s 
market to book ratio and penny stocks, to the likelihood of deal completion. There are 317 deals in our final sample, 282 
completed deals versus 35 uncompleted deals. In the U.S. subsample, there are 147completed deals versus 26 uncompleted 
deals. In the Canadian subsample, there are 135 completed deals versus 9 uncompleted deals. ). Sizediff represents the size 
difference between acquirer and target scaled by acquirer’s size. Geo dummy variable equals 1 when the acquirer and the 
target are in the same city and otherwise equals 0. SIC dummy variable equals 1 when target and acquirer are in the same 
industry and otherwise equals 0.MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. Penny stock dummy variable 
equals 1 when acquirer’s closing price of the day before deal announcement less than $5 and otherwise equals 0. The p-
values of Chi-square test are shown in the brackets. 
 Entire Sample U.S. Subsample Canadian Subsample 
Variables Coefficient Pr > ChiSq Coefficient Pr > ChiSq Coefficient Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 2.340 (0.000) 1.954 (0.000) 9.365 (0.003) 
Sizediff -0.287 (0.440) -0.079 (0.795) -5.082* (0.067) 
Geo 0.710* (0.099) 1.783* (0.093) -2.018* (0.084) 
SIC -0.123 (0.763) -0.065 (0.888) -0.696 (0.540) 
MB_ratio -0.005 (0.923) -0.016 (0.844) -0.047 (0.722) 
Penny_stock -0.760* (0.063) -1.207* (0.020) -1.293 (0.159) 
R-Square 0.020  0.054  0.073  
Max-rescaled R-Square 0.040  0.095  0.195  
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 8.2: Logistic Model Fitness of Deal Completion 
This table displays the percent correct prediction of deal completion. Response 1 represents completed deal and 
Response 0 represents uncompleted deal. The column shows the predicted response of deals and the percentage of correct 
prediction. The percentage of correct prediction of the model overall is shown in the last row. 
 Entire Predicted U.S. Predicted Canadian Predicted 
Observed Response 1 % Correct 1 % Correct 1 % Correct 
0 35 0.00% 26 0.00% 9 0.00% 
1 282 88.96% 147 84.97% 135 93.75% 
Overall  88.96%  84.97%  93.75% 
 
Geo dummy is positively related and Penny stock dummy is negatively related 
to the completion of O&G transactions in the whole sample, as shown in Table 
8.1. In other words, the likelihood of completing a deal will be higher if the 
acquirer is not a low-priced firm or if the acquirer and the target are from the 
same city, partially supporting our Hypothesis 5. Since most of the uncompleted 
transactions are from the U.S., we observe a similar outcome from the U.S. 
subsample. In the Canadian subsample, however, the uncompleted deal is more 
likely to be the local deal or have the large size difference. We test the overall 
performance of the model in Table 8.2. The prediction performance of the model 
is not very good. Especially in the U.S. subsample, the overall percentage of 
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correct predictions is only 84.97%. Although the independent variables in a 
logistic regression do not have to be normally distributed, we notice that the 
number of completed deals outweighs the number of uncompleted deals, which 
could lead to an opposite result in the U.S. and Canada about how the geographic 
proximity affect the probability of deal completion. 
Since the low-priced firm presents a pronounced influence on deal completion, 
it is essential to examine the characteristics of those penny stocks. Particularly, 
the penny stocks should be separate from the whole sample if they tend to less 
liquid. The small public companies with low-priced stocks will skew the market 
reaction towards the deal announcement due to their higher volatilities. Ball et al. 
(1995) documented that low-priced stock are highly sensitive towards the 
liquidity effect. Since those stocks are seldom traded, a slightly shift of the price 
will lead to a dramatic change of mean of the returns, in their case $1/8
th
 increase 
of stock price would reduce the mean by 25%. In Hypothesis 6, we anticipate that 
acquirers with low liquidity and high idiosyncratic risk are more likely to be 
penny stock acquirers. The second logistic regression result is illustrated in Table 
9.1 and the logistic model fitness result is displayed in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.1: Logistic Regression of Penny Stock 
This table relates certain acquirer’s characteristics, such as market to book ratio, illiquidity, idiosyncratic risk and 
leverage, to the likelihood that the acquirer is a penny stock. There are 317 deals in our final sample, 64 penny stocks 
versus 243 non-penny stocks. In the U.S. subsample, there are 22 penny stocks versus 141 non-penny stocks. In the 
Canadian subsample, there are 42 penny stocks versus 102 non-penny stocks. MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio 
of acquirer. Illiquidity dummy variable equals 1 when usable returns from estimation window less than 120 in the U.S. 
subsample or usable returns from estimation window less than 100 in the Canadian subsample and otherwise equals 
0.Idiosyn represents the acquirer’s idiosyncratic risk. Leverage represents the acquirer’s total liability divided by its book 
equity. The p-values of Chi-square test are shown in the brackets. 
 Entire Sample U.S. Subsample Canadian Subsample 
Variables Coefficient Pr > ChiSq Coefficient Pr > ChiSq Coefficient Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -2.864 (0.000) -3.221 (0.000) -1.556 (0.010) 
MB ratio -0.047 (0.377) -0.122 (0.366) -0.054 (0.327) 
Illiquidity 1.766*** (0.000) 1.635* (0.060) 1.587*** (0.005) 
Idiosyn 0.498*** (0.000) 0.340* (0.057) 0.564*** (0.000) 
Leverage 0.129 (0.100) 0.479** (0.020) -1.569** (0.016) 
R-Square 0.201  0.132  0.309  
Max-rescaled R-Square 0.314  0.242  0.441  




Table 9.2: Logistic Model Fitness of Penny Stock 
This table displays the percent correct prediction of being a penny stock. Response 1 represents penny stock and 
Response 0 represents non-penny stock. The column shows the predicted response of deals and the percentage of correct 
prediction. The percentage of correct prediction of the model overall is shown in the last row. 
 Entire Predicted  U.S .Predicted  Canada Predicted  
Observed Response 0 1 % Correct 0 1 % Correct 0 1 % Correct 
0 232 11 75.57% 140 1 85.89% 91 11 63.19% 
1 42 22 7.17% 16 6 3.68% 21 21 14.58% 
Overall   82.74%   89.57%   77.77% 
 
As expected, penny stocks have significant illiquidity issue and higher level of 
idiosyncratic risk, which supported our Hypothesis 6. To eliminate the promoter 
effect of penny stocks in both U.S. and Canada, we create a new subsample with 
all penny stocks from both countries. Additionally, the financial slack level of 
low-priced firm is different in the U.S. and Canadian subsample. We found that 
the U.S. low-priced firm has higher leverage relative to the low-priced Canadian 
firm. 
5.3. Correlation Analysis 
Before estimating an ordinary least square (OLS) regression, we detect the 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables by constructing three 
correlation metrics in order to model a better regression. 
Table 10: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix categorized by different sample. Size represents the size difference between 
acquirer and target scaled by acquirer’s size. MB represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. SIC dummy variable 
equals 1 when the acquirer and the target are in the same industry and otherwise equals 0. Geo dummy variable equals 1 
when the acquirer and the target are in the same city and otherwise equals 0. The p-values of the coefficients are presented 
in the brackets. 
 US    CA    Penny    
 Sizediff MB_ratio SIC Geo Sizediff MB_ratio SIC Geo Sizediff MB_ratio SIC Geo 
Sizediff 1    1    1    
             MB_ratio 0.071 1   -0.203** 1   -0.120 1   
 (0.396)    (0.041)    (0.331)    
SIC -0.069 0.143* 1  -0.175* 0.018 1  -0.199 0.012 1  
 (0.404) (0.083)   (0.079) (0.858)   (0.103) (0.922)   
Geo -0.118 0.116 0.156* 1 -0.295*** -0.126 0.301*** 1 -0.092 -0.166 0.432*** 1 
 (0.153) (0.164) (0.059)  (0.003) (0.206) (0.002)  (0.454) (0.175) (0.000)  





Table 10 indicates that the SIC dummy variable is positively correlated with 
MB ratio and geographical proximity dummy variable. It is reasonable to observe 
this correlation since there is an industry cluster in the oil and gas industry. 
Therefore, we will not take the SIC dummy variable as our control variables in 
the following regression. In addition, the geographical proximity dummy variable 
shows a correlation with size difference in the U.S. subsample. But a causative 
connection between these two variables is indirect and not obvious. In turn, it is 
reasonable to keep geographical dummy variable as our key explanatory variables 
in the multivariate regression. 
5.4. Multivariate Analysis 
After validating that no significant correlation exists between our remaining 
key explanatory variables, a multivariate regression is used to specify which 
characteristics can explain the cumulative abnormal return of M&As in the oil and 
gas industry. A basic multivariate regression involving three variables is 
estimated at first. Then four other regressions containing additional variables are 
estimated accordingly. The results are summarized in Table 11.1, Regression (1) – 
(4), and in Table 11.2, Regression (5). We believe that there is a discrepancy 
between penny stocks and non-penny stocks. Therefore, we divide our sample 
into two subsamples according to their stock price and then separate the non-
penny stock transactions based on acquirer’s nationality. We examine their 
characteristics using the same regressions. As expected, the estimates are 
dramatically different in U.S., Canadian and penny stock subsamples. 
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Table 11.1: Multivariate Regression Model (1) – (4) 
This table exhibits the coefficients and their p-values, shown in the brackets, for each variable in the different subsamples. US, CA, and PS represent U.S. subsample, Canadian 
subsample and penny stock subsample respectively. The dependent variable is the five-day CAR in event window (-2, 2). Sizediff represents the size difference between acquirer 
and target scaled by acquirer’s size. MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. Geo dummy variable equals 1 when the acquirer and the target are in the same city 
and otherwise equals 0. Target public dummy variable equals 1 when the target is a public firm and otherwise equals 0. Stock dummy variable equals 1 when the payment of the 
deal is 100% stock and otherwise equals 0. The interaction term Stock*Target public equals 1 when a bidder who acquirers a public target through 100% stock payment. Canada 
dummy variable is only used in subsample PS in order to control the country difference of penny stock. 
 US    CA    PS    
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.016 0.018 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.848) (0.377) (0.982) (0.930) (0.556) (0.894) (0.852) (0.879) (0.572) (0.530) (0.879) (0.760) 
Sizediff -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.026** 0.022* 0.020 0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.492) (0.867) (0.542) (0.627) (0.037) (0.080) (0.126) (0.153) (0.151) (0.144) (0.371) (0.428) 
MB_ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005* -0.006** -0.005* -0.005* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.308) (0.274) (0.341) (0.349) (0.056) (0.041) (0.053) (0.055) (0.788) (0.788) (0.771) (0.843) 
Geo -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.010 0.005 0.006 -0.078** -0.073* -0.080** -0.066* 
 (0.806) (0.568) (0.659) (0.576) (0.851) (0.366) (0.599) (0.590) (0.025) (0.053) (0.020) (0.066) 
Target Public  0.010*    -0.018*    -0.012   
  (0.059)    (0.089)    (0.716)   
Stock   0.014* -0.034   -0.018 -0.011   0.066* 0.110** 
   (0.078) (0.208)   (0.125) (0.672)   (0.053) (0.031) 
Stock*Target Public    0.052*    -0.008    -0.071 
    (0.064)    (0.781)    (0.241) 
Canada         0.039 0.039 0.040 0.035 
         (0.269) (0.272) (0.239) (0.310) 
Adj R-Sq -0.011 0.007 0.004 0.021 0.074 0.092 0.087 0.078 0.040 0.027 0.082 0.088 
Number of Obs 147 147 147 147 102 102 102 102 68 68 68 68 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 11.2: Multivariate Regression Model (5) 
This table exhibits the coefficients and their p-values, shown in the brackets, for each variable in regression (5). US, CA, 
and PS represent U.S. subsample, Canadian subsample and penny stock subsample respectively. There are 307 out of 317 
deals with sufficient data for regression (5), 141 U.S. deals, 102 Canadian deals and 64 penny stock deals respectively. The 
dependent variable is the five-day CAR in event window (-2, 2). Sizediff represents the size difference between acquirer 
and target scaled by acquirer’s size. MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. Geo dummy variable equals 
1 when the acquirer and the target are in the same city and otherwise equals 0. Target public dummy variable equals 1 
when the target is a public firm and otherwise equals 0. Stock dummy variable equals 1 when the payment of the deal is 
100% stock and otherwise equals 0. Idiosyn represents the acquirer’s idiosyncratic risk. Leverage represents the acquirer’s 
total liability divided by its book equity. % change cl1 represent the daily percentage change of crude oil futures price. 
Lagged GDP represent the GDP change in year before deal announcement. Canada dummy variable is only used in 
subsample PS in order to control the country difference of penny stock. 
 US CA PS 
Variable (5) (5) (5) 
Intercept -0.126 -0.041 0.253 
 (0.237) (0.511) (0.375) 
Sizediff 0.002 0.026* -0.005 
 (0.751) (0.053) (0.751) 
MB_ratio 0.000 -0.006** 0.000 
 (0.841) (0.041) (0.956) 
Geo 0.000 0.010 -0.073* 
 (0.962) (0.404) (0.053) 
Target Public 0.009 -0.014 -0.035 
 (0.122) (0.213) (0.344) 
Stock 0.010 -0.015 0.101** 
 (0.281) (0.233) (0.012) 
Idiosyn -0.001 0.006* -0.003 
 (0.765) (0.056) (0.703) 
Leverage 0.002 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.550) (0.409) (0.696) 
% change cl1 0.035 -0.014 0.447** 
 (0.323) (0.866) (0.033) 
Lagged GDP 0.114 0.030 -0.239 
 (0.266) (0.578) (0.395) 
Canada   0.047 
   (0.243) 
Adj R-Sq 0.002 0.106 0.131 
Number of Obs 141 102 64 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Overall, each subsample has its unique characteristics. The Panel US and Panel 
CA in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 present the estimates of the cross-sectional regression 
for the U.S. and Canadian subsamples respectively. We find that the coefficient 
on the size difference is significant and positive, approximately 0.025, in the 
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Canadian subsample, meaning that a large size difference
7
 would give rise to a 
positive market reaction towards the deal announcement. Shareholders are more 
interested in smaller targets. Thereby, Hypothesis 1 has been rejected. The reason 
is that large firms with more advanced technology tend to have lower unit cost 
and can apply this knowledge to targets (Neubecker and Stadler (2003)). In other 
words, the investors expect a cost saving and efficiency improvement of the small 
target if acquired by a relatively large firm. 
The impact of the MB ratio is very different in the U.S. and Canadian markets. 
The U.S. market is less sensitive towards higher MB ratio when compared to the 
Canadian market, even though the mean and median of MB ratio is significant 
higher in the United States. It is notable that market to book ratio is negatively 
related to the CAR throughout Table 11.1 and Table 11.2 Panel CA at 0.1 
significance level. It indicates that value firms will receive a positive market 
response after the deal is announced because the CAR decreases by 
approximately -0.005 for each unit increase in the MB ratio. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 4 has been rejected in U.S. subsample but supported in Canadian 
subsample. 
Moreover, we observe that the U.S. market response is positively related to the 
public status of the target firm in Regression (2). However, an opposite result is 
shown in the Canadian market. A public target firm is more likely to bring a 
negative CAR to Canadian bidders, which is consistent with Officer (2007). 
Regarding the method of payment, a positive impact of 100% stock payment on 
CAR is significant in the U.S. subsample. Hypothesis 8 is rejected. The potential 
explanation is that the transaction value in the U.S. hydrocarbon industry is large 
so that the cash payment will generate a pronounced tax obligation. A stock 
                                                 
7
 A large Sizediff means that the target is small. 
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exchange could help the target shareholders to defer the tax, which allows the 
acquirer to bid lower without considering the tax issue. In addition, the market 
will react positively towards a stock payment when the target is public. The 
significant result about target public status is not consistent in Regression (5) after 
adding more control variables. 
Furthermore, we have insignificant result in regression (5) to support 
Hypothesis 3 that lower leverage will lead to a positive acquirer’s performance 
after the announcement. As for the geographic proximity effect, we cannot infer a 
strong preference for geographically proximate acquisitions in both U.S. market 
and Canadian market. All of the variables, except for the interaction terms, are 
included in Table 11.2, suggesting that 5-day abnormal return in respective 
countries is seldom affected by macro economy characteristics. 
The Panel PS in Table 11.1 and Table 11.2 summarize the results of the cross-
sectional regression using the penny stock subsample. Ackert and Tian (2008) 
find that liquidity has a positive effect on pricing efficiency and indicated that 
more active trading reduces the mispricing. Sadka and Scherbina (2007) also find 
that illiquid stocks with high analyst disagreement are usually overpriced. The 
acquirer who has low-priced stocks is under public scrutiny once the deal is 
announced. This provides investors a chance to review the acquirer’s stock price. 
Then, the market will adjust the mispricing rapidly according to Cooper et al. 
(1985). We infer that there is no mispricing effect towards the low-priced stocks 
for the insignificant coefficient of the MB ratio. The local deal decreases 
acquirer’s CAR in the Penny stock subsample, which rejected Hypothesis 2. The 
possible explanation of the negative reaction in Penny stock subsample is that the 
geographical proximity of headquarters does not necessarily reflect the proximity 
of the oil basins. Instead of saving on soft information, the distance between 
construction sites is more important for the investors. Also, the stock payment is 
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positively related to low-priced acquirer’s performance, consistent with the 
outcome from the U.S. subsample. Last, we notice that the crude oil price affects 
low-priced acquirer positively. We summarize our findings corresponding to each 
hypothesis in Table 12. 
Table 12: Summary of findings 
The summary of our findings in the entire sample and two subsamples is presented according to nine hypotheses. The 
tick mark represents the hypothesis is supported by our results, whereas the cross mark represents the hypothesis is rejected 
by our results. The brackets indicate that the hypothesis is partially supported. 
Hypotheses: EM US CA PS 
H1 Target size + CAR  Insign.  Insign. 
H2 Geo. Prox. + CAR   Insign. Insign.  
H3 Lev.- CAR  Insign. Insign. Insign. 
H4 MB ratio - CAR  Insign.  Insign. 
H5 Deal completion () ()   
H6 Penny stock     
H7 Idiosyncratic risk - 
CAR 
 Insign.  Insign. 
H8 Stock pay - US 
CAR; Mix pay + 
CA CAR 
 () Insign.  
H9 Pvt. target + CAR  () () Insign. 
 
6. Additional Test of Different Event Windows 
Since we only focused on acquirer’s CAR from event window (-2, 2) in 
previous study, we now conduct an additional test about our results by using 
acquirer’s CAR from different event windows. Event window (3, 30) is expected 
to provide a general idea of how the market will react after the announcement of 
mergers and acquisition. Event window (-30, -3) is utilized to capture the 
information leakage before the deal announcement. The independent variables 
used in the multivariate regression are the same as those in regression (1) and 
regression (5). The regression result is presented in Table 13. 
44 
 
Table 13: Cumulative Abnormal Return from Different Event Window 
This table exhibits cross-sectional regression results from different event windows (-30, -3) and (3, 30) respectively. The coefficients and 
their p-values from regression (1) and regression (5) are displayed in Panel A for U.S. subsample, Panel B for Canadian subsample and Panel C 
for Penny stock subsample. There are 307 out of 317 deals with sufficient data for regression (5), 141 U.S. deals, 102 Canadian deals and 64 
penny stock deals respectively. The dependent variable is the acquirer’s CAR various from different event windows. Sizediff represents the 
size difference between acquirer and target scaled by acquirer’s size. MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. Geo dummy 
variable equals 1 when the acquirer and the target are in the same city and otherwise equals 0. Target public dummy variable equals 1 when the 
target is a public firm and otherwise equals 0. Stock dummy variable equals 1 when the payment of the deal is 100% stock and otherwise 
equals 0. Idiosyn represents the acquirer’s idiosyncratic risk. Leverage represents the acquirer’s total liability divided by its book equity. % 
change cl1 represent the daily percentage change of crude oil futures price. Lagged GDP represent the GDP change in year before deal 
announcement. Canada dummy variable is only used in subsample PS in order to control the country difference of penny stock.  
Panel A - US (-30, -3)        (3, 30)        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  
Variable Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.036 (0.133) 0.036 (0.203) 0.030 (0.211) -0.122 (0.796) 0.055 (0.024) 0.057 (0.054) 0.053 (0.031) 0.116 (0.805) 
Sizediff -0.032 (0.203) -0.032 (0.243) -0.030 (0.234) -0.051* (0.075) -0.020 (0.428) -0.021 (0.453) -0.020 (0.448) -0.029 (0.309) 
MB_ratio -0.004 (0.415) -0.004 (0.416) -0.004 (0.358) -0.001 (0.839) -0.019*** (0.000) -0.019*** (0.000) -0.020*** (0.000) -0.018*** (0.003) 
Geo -0.028 (0.301) -0.028 (0.313) -0.035 (0.200) -0.042 (0.142) 0.004 (0.872) 0.005 (0.864) 0.002 (0.935) -0.002 (0.956) 
Target Public   -0.001 (0.968)   -0.035 (0.192)   -0.002 (0.936)   -0.024 (0.378) 
Stock     0.076** (0.030) 0.096** (0.015)     0.026 (0.478) 0.028 (0.468) 
Idiosyn       0.003 (0.749)       -0.013 (0.104) 
Leverage       -0.018 (0.180)       0.033** (0.013) 
% change cl1       0.313** (0.048)       0.186 (0.235) 
Lagged GDP       0.180 (0.692)       -0.075 (0.868) 
Adj R-Sq 0.003  -0.004  0.029  0.046  0.111  0.104  0.108  0.057  
Number of Obs 147  147  147  141  147  147  147  141  
Panel B - CA (-30, -3)        (3, 30)        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  
Variable Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.043 (0.259) -0.049 (0.219) -0.037 (0.349) -0.092 (0.534) -0.076 (0.218) -0.090 (0.164) -0.057 (0.373) -0.102 (0.670) 
Sizediff 0.061** (0.032) 0.064** (0.028) 0.055* (0.064) 0.041 (0.187) 0.128*** (0.006) 0.135*** (0.004) 0.110** (0.023) 0.103** (0.045) 
MB_ratio -0.005 (0.479) -0.004 (0.507) -0.005 (0.478) -0.005 (0.485) -0.021** (0.048) -0.020* (0.056) -0.021** (0.047) -0.020* (0.063) 
Geo 0.013 (0.582) 0.007 (0.795) 0.016 (0.502) 0.013 (0.633) 0.021 (0.580) 0.007 (0.875) 0.032 (0.418) 0.016 (0.715) 
Target Public   0.014 (0.580)   0.014 (0.605)   0.032 (0.424)   0.045 (0.306) 
Stock     -0.017 (0.542) -0.021 (0.487)     -0.054 (0.225) -0.067 (0.165) 
Idiosyn       -0.014* (0.083)       -0.011 (0.392) 
Leverage       0.008 (0.661)       0.008 (0.788) 
% change cl1       0.081 (0.680)       0.045 (0.886) 
Lagged GDP       0.070 (0.580)       0.047 (0.821) 
Adj R-Sq 0.033  0.026  0.027  0.020  0.113  0.110  0.117  0.092  
Number of Obs 102  102  102  102  102  102  102  102  
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Panel C - PS (-30, -3)        (3, 30)        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  
Variable Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.061 (0.184) 0.064 (0.177) 0.070 (0.156) 0.214 (0.654) -0.012 (0.887) -0.008 (0.924) 0.001 (0.991) 0.153 (0.867) 
Sizediff 0.005 (0.816) 0.004 (0.850) 0.002 (0.935) 0.009 (0.707) -0.007 (0.872) -0.008 (0.854) -0.012 (0.792) 0.007 (0.883) 
MB_ratio 0.001 (0.843) 0.001 (0.845) 0.001 (0.841) 0.000 (0.956) 0.000 (0.990) 0.000 (0.989) 0.000 (0.992) 0.001 (0.934) 
Geo 0.045 (0.424) 0.052 (0.398) 0.046 (0.420) 0.034 (0.586) 0.073 (0.491) 0.081 (0.482) 0.074 (0.488) 0.088 (0.462) 
Target Public   -0.017 (0.768)   0.005 (0.933)   -0.020 (0.852)   -0.027 (0.817) 
Stock     -0.030 (0.601) 0.010 (0.882)     -0.044 (0.683) 0.043 (0.731) 
Idiosyn       -0.025* (0.088)       -0.033 (0.234) 
Leverage       -0.002 (0.687)       -0.009 (0.353) 
% change cl1       0.444 (0.201)       1.338** (0.046) 
Lagged GDP       -0.086 (0.856)       -0.097 (0.914) 
Canada -0.089 (0.123) -0.089 (0.126) -0.090 (0.122) -0.059 (0.380) -0.034 (0.752) -0.034 (0.755) -0.035 (0.746) -0.002 (0.986) 
Adj R-Sq -0.022  -0.037  -0.034  -0.046  -0.054  -0.071  -0.069  -0.051  
Number of Obs 68  68  68  64  68  68  68  64  
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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In Panel A U.S. subsample, 100% stock payment and percentage change of 
CL1 are positively related to acquirer’s performance before the deal 
announcement. After the deal announcement, we notice that the value acquirer 
with lower MB ratio performs better, which supports the fourth hypothesis. In 
Panel B Canadian subsample, the size difference is positively correlated to 
acquirer’s performance both before and after the deal announcement. The 
negative correlation between acquirer’s MB ratio and CAR indicate the glamour 
acquirers receive a bad response from the market. The previous outcome holds 
water. While the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk is significantly positive in Table 
11.2, it turns to significantly negative during the pre-announcement period. We 
assume that the “predictable firms” with lower idiosyncratic risk have pronounced 
pre-bid run-up, whereas the “unpredictable firms” with higher idiosyncratic risk 
have pronounced post-bid markup. This result indicates that the investors have 
difficulties with distinguishing the M&As rumor from noise of firms with high 
idiosyncratic volatilities. As a result, the stock price of a “predictable firm” will 
increase immediately when an acquisition rumor spread. The stock price of an 
“unpredictable firm”, in contrast, will maintain at the same level and eventually 
increase after the announcement of the deal. The mixture of those two effects 
leads to a change of the coefficient among different event windows. In Panel C 
Penny stock subsample, however, the outcome changed a lot after switching event 
windows. We observe a compatible outcome that the idiosyncratic risk is 
negatively related to acquirer’s performance during the pre-announcement period. 
Notably, the adjusted R-squared is a negative number, suggesting that the fitness 
of the regression model is worse. 
7. Case Study 
We conduct three out-of-sample case studies in order to examine the 
implications of the model estimated in the previous section and to explore the 
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unique features of each transaction which are neglected in the large sample 
analysis. The cases may also help us to reconcile the results of large sample 
analysis which are not consistent with our hypothesis. Moreover, it provides the 
opportunity to investigate the acquirer’s performance during the post-acquisition 
period. One Canadian firm, Crescent Point Energy Corp., and two United States 
firms, Linn Energy, LLC and Continental Resources, Inc., are selected as our 
acquirers. As the size of the United States oil and gas firms is, in general, greater 
than the Canadian oil and gas firms in our large sample analysis, we chose a large 
Canadian firm relative to all Canadian oil and gas firms so that we could find a 
U.S. oil and gas firm with a comparable level of total revenue. We study three 
deals occurring in 2012 and 2013. Our aim is to present some common standards 
which can be used during the due diligence process in the oil and gas industry. 
Since the acquirer could complete the transactions in various ways, such as invest 
through a subsidiary, or convert to a trust, or purchase a target which is owned by 
someone on the acquirer’s board, case studies could help us to investigate the 
connections between acquirer and target which is hard to realize in the large 
sample analysis due to the data limitations. In addition, the frequent 
announcements of buybacks and acquisitions of assets make the acquirer’s stock 
price more volatile. As a result, we may not observe a significant CAR in the 
short term after the deal announcement despite the economic importance of the 
transaction. Before we step into individual cases, it is always better to have a 
general picture of the historical transactions made by each company. We examine 
all their transactions from SDC platinum between 2002 and 2013, including 




Table 14: Deal Summary 
This table presents total number and total value of the transactions announced between 2002 and 2013, extracted from 
SDC platinum. Acquisition of assets and buybacks are included. The transaction value includes all the payments made 
within six months of the announcement date. The total number and total value of mergers and acquisitions of majority 
interest are presented in brackets. CPG represents Crescent Point Energy Corp. CPG Trust represents Crescent Point 
Energy Trust. LINE represents Linn Energy, LLC. LNCO represents LinnCo, LLC. CLR represents Continental Resources, 
Inc. 
Panel A: Total Number of Transactions by Years 
Year CPG CPG Trust LINE LNCO CLR Grand Total 
2002 3 (0)     3 (0) 
2003 2 (1)     2 (1) 
2004  1 (0)    1 (1) 
2005  4 (1)    4 (0) 
2006  7 (2) 4 (0)   11 (2) 
2007  3 (2) 5 (0)   8 (2) 
2008  3 (1) 1 (0)  1 (0) 5 (1) 
2009 4 (2) 2 (2) 3 (0)   9 (4) 
2010 1 (1) 1 (1) 4 (0)   6 (2) 
2011 1 (0)  6 (0)   7 (0) 
2012 7 (3)  4 (0)  2 (1) 13 (4) 
2013   1 (0) 1 (1)  2 (1) 
Grand Total 18 (7) 21 (9) 28 (0) 1 (1) 3 (1) 71 (18) 
Panel B: Total Value of Transactions by Years (USD$ Million) 
Year CPG CPG Trust LINE LNCO CLR Grand Total 
2002 7.03 
 
    7.03 
2003 61.54 
 
    61.54 
2004  49.70 
 
   49.70 
2005  396.10 
(81.77) 
   396.10 
(81.77) 
2006  686.25 
(623.67) 
870.00   1556.25 
(623.67) 
2007  486.75 
(470.43) 
2637.20   3123.95 
(470.43) 
2008  536.46 
(379.59) 
















 1209.00   1251.34 
2012 2874.47 
(1124.84) 






















Table 14 summarizes transactions completed by our acquirers and their 
subsidiaries. Crescent Point Energy Trust completed an array of transactions from 
2004 to 2009 and converted to Crescent Point Energy Corp in 2009. The Trust 
ceased reporting to SEDAR in 2009. However, there is a transaction recorded 
under the Trust in 2010 which is actually conducted by Crescent Point Energy 
Corp., because the Trust made an equity investment in the target firm several 
years prior. LinnCo, LLC (LNCO) a subsidiary of Linn Energy, LLC, was 
established in 2012 to raise capital for the parent firm. As we can see from Table 
14, the Canadian company and its subsidiary conducted numerous deals, more 
than the sum of the other two firms. The transaction value, however, is less than 
that of Linn Energy and its subsidiary. Furthermore, we notice that there are many 
acquisitions of assets and buybacks by all three companies, which will have an 
impact on the estimation of acquirer’s CAR because it makes it hard to isolate the 
impact of a single transaction. It is also noteworthy that the transaction value from 
SDC is different from the M&As size obtained from Capital IQ.
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We concentrate on studying our three ultimate parent firms: Crescent Point 
Energy Corp. (CPG), Linn Energy, LLC (LINE), and Continental Resources, Inc. 
(CLR). Firm size of those three firms, measured by revenues in 2011, is similar as 
shown in Table 15. However, the approaches they used to select, structure, and 
complete a deal varies from one to another. The following in-depth investigations 
will unveil those details. 
Table 15: Financials at Year-end 2011 
The total revenue and gross profit of three acquirers examined in the case study, extracted from Capital IQ. 
 CPG LINE CLR 
Currency CAD USD USD 
Total Revenue ($ Million) 1822.496 1172.514 1679.838 
Gross Profit ($ Million) 1470.292 907.856 1370.157 
                                                 
8
 SDC calculates the transaction value as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer 
within six months of the announcement date of the transaction, whereas Capital IQ calculates the 




7.1. Calgary-based Crescent Point acquires Calgary-based Wild Stream 
7.1.1. Case Background  
Crescent Point Energy Corp. began trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 
2001 and is engaged in acquiring, developing and exploiting oil and gas 
properties primarily in Western Canada. It also has assets in the United States 
which contributed approximately 11.6% of revenue at year-end 2013. The U.S. 
contribution was merely 0.6% at year-end 2011. The conventional oil and gas 
company was in the stage of expansion during past years. Crescent Point 
converted to a trust in 2003 after merging with Tappit Resources Ltd.  and 
returned to being a dividend-paying corporation in 2009. In 2012, CPG led 
Canadian domestic transactions in the oil and gas industry with the acquisition of 
Wild Stream Exploration Inc (WSX), with properties in southwest Saskatchewan, 
for approximately $610 million and the acquisition of Cutpick Energy Inc, with 
assets in Alberta, for approximately $425 million. In total, CPG completed more 
than $3 billion in acquisitions during 2012. We examine CPG’s first and largest 
$610 million acquisition of WSX in 2012 as the Canadian example. 
With a $1.1 billion capital expenditure budget, and plans to spend in Bakken in 
southeast Saskatchewan, Shaunanvon in southwest Saskachewan, Beaverhill Lake 
in Alberta and in North Dakota, CPG started its acquisition journey in 2012. Scott 
Saxberg, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of CPG, said “The 
budget is designed to provide for another low-risk year of organic growth through 
the drill bit on our major oil resource plays in Saskatchewan while expanding our 
new emerging resource plays in Alberta and North Dakota.” (News release, 
December 5, 2011, retrieved from SEDAR) He was a founder of Crescent Point in 
2001 and has been CEO and president of CPG since 2003. The company expected 





. Nevertheless, it was just the beginning. On January 24th, 2012, CPG 
announced a $610 million acquisition of publicly traded WSX with an exchange 
rate of 0.17 of a CPG share for each WSX share for all of the issued and 
outstanding shares of WSX, including approximately $50.8 million of WSX debt.  
CPG increased their capital expenditure budget by $50 million to $1.15 billion. A 
spinoff Newco
10
, Raging River Exploration Inc., was expected to start operations 
after the deal completion, and be lead by WSX’s President and CEO, Neil 
Roszell, and four members from WSX’s management team. The corporate 
structure is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: The Corporate Structure after Deal Completion 
 
The Newco would focus on exploration and development in the upper part of 
the Dodsland play. In the acquisition agreement, shareholders would also receive 
1 Newco common share and 0.2 Newco purchase warrant for each common share 
                                                 
9
 boe/d, barrels of oil equivalent, is generally deemed to have the same amount of energy content 
as 6,000 cubic feet of natural gas. 
10
 Newco means a new company, in this case, it is the raging river. 
Crescent Point 
CEO: Scott Saxberg 
Wild Stream 
CEO: Neil Roszell 
NewCo:Ranging River 





of WSX. If the agreement is completed according to the plan, the net asset value 
of Newco was expected to be $120.4 million. The deal closed on March 15, 2012, 
allowing WSX shareholders to receive CPG’s March 2012 dividend. 
7.1.2. CPG’s motivation for purchasing WSX 
First, the location of WSX’s assets is essential in this acquisition. According to 
CPG’s news release on January 24, 2012, 91% of WSX’s daily production, 
approximately 4,900 boe/d, is from the areas contiguous with those of CPG and 
90% of which is comprised by oil.  CPG also gains a large number of net sections 
of land and low-risk drilling locations next to their existing assets in the 
Shaunavon and Beaverhill Lake resource plays. From one point of view, this 
acquisition will further solidify CPG’s dominant position in the Shaunavon 
resource play. From the other aspect, it will complement their existing position in 
the Beaverhill Lake resource play. The company expected to improve their 
average daily production in 2012 to 83,500 boe/d from 80,000 boe/d by capital 
expenditure in those two areas. 
The second motivation is not as obvious. WSX is a leftover asset of Wild River 
Resources Ltd. CPG acquired this privately held firm three years ago and Neil 
Roszell was the President and Chief Executive Officer of Wild River in 2009 as 
shown in Figure 6. Based on WSX’s news release on January 24, 2012, 
management believed that WSX’s shareholders could continue exposure to the 
Shaunavon resource play with an anticipated monthly dividend of $0.23 per share 
and direct participation in the development of Newco’s Dodsland asset. They 
convinced the shareholders of WSX to support the acquisition agreement. In this 
case, we assume that CPG offered a fair bid price to WSX although those two 
plays attracts more investors relative to the situation in 2009. The tax pools are 
estimated at $350 million. 
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Figure 6: The Corporate Structure of the Deal in 2009 
 
 
More interestingly, a toehold strategy has been used frequently by CPG. In 
their prior transactions, they are likely to have a certain amount of target shares in 
order to be a holding company. This contrasts the toehold puzzle mentioned by 
Bulow et al. (1999) and Betton and Eckbo (2000). Bidders with toeholds are 
expected to be more aggressive, leading to a lower bid premium and a lower 
probability of deal completion. Betton et al. (2009) improved their former result 
in 2000. They stated that the optimal toehold is either zero in order to reduce the 
possibility of rejection or above average 9% in order to cover the costs of tender 
offer if the acquisition is rejected by the target management. CPG seems have a 
good understanding of this rule. For example, in the largest transactions among 
CPG’s history, they held 21% equity interest of Shelter Bay Energy, Inc. before 
they announced the acquisition in 2010. The same thing happened in the deal after 
they acquired WSX. CPG announced the acquisition agreement of Reliable 
Energy Ltd. with 12.8% equity interest in March 15
th
, 2013. In the case of 
Crescent Point 
CEO: Scott Saxberg 
Wild River 
CEO: Neil Roszell 
Wild Stream 






acquiring WSX, they use the zero optimal toeholds instead. In our large sample, 
however, it is not common to have toehold acquirers. Twenty five out of 317 
transactions are conducted by toehold bidders. Moreover, the toehold structure is 
not used in the other two American cases. 
7.1.3. Shareholder Value Implications 
We extract the stock price from Bloomberg. It is noteworthy that CPG is listed 
on both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX). Given the 3-month average volume as of April 4th, CPG is much more 
active in TSX with a volume 1,143,260 versus 44,292 on NYSE. We assume that 
the announcement date is Day 0 and counted based on trading days. The graph of 
stock price is shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: CPG Stock Price in Short Term 
     This figure shows acquirer’s stock price changes during the 61-day event window, (-30, 30). 
 
 
We observe a sharp increase of CPG’s stock price from Day -26 to Day -14. 
Later the stock price dropped and then increased again from Day -5. There is a 
decline after the announcement of acquisition agreement. A few days later, the 
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Day -25 (Dec 15, 2011): The company confirmed the payment of Dec 2011 
dividend for $0.23. 
Day -6 (Jan 15, 2012): The company confirmed the payment of Jan 2012 
dividend for $0.23. 
Day 16 (Feb 15, 2012): The company confirmed the payment of Feb 2012 
dividend for $0.23. 
Day 17 (Feb 16, 2012): The company announced the Bakken acquisition, 
accompanied by $525 million bought deal financing
11
. On the same day, the 
company also announced a Manitoba asset acquisition which closed on Day 1 
(Jan 25, 2012). 
 
While the confirmation of dividends was followed by a stock price increase, the 
announcement of the Bakken acquisition and bought deal financing was 
associated with a drop in the stock price. We are interested in the cause of the 
stock price change around the deal announcement day, whether it is attributable to 
the volatility of CPG’s stock or to the event itself. The cumulative abnormal 
return, displayed in Figure 8, could help us to explain CPG’s stock performance. 
The announcement day is selected as day 0 and the 120-trading day estimation 
window, 05/26/2011 to 11/16/2011, is used to estimate the market model 
parameters. We calculate the t-statistic by dividing the abnormal return by its 
standard error from the estimation period. The t-statistic for multiple event days is 
computed as the sum of the t-statistics for each individual day divided by the 




                                                 
11
 A bought deal is that a company issues new shares in a discounted price and an investment bank 
(or a group of investment banks) commit to buy those new securities, which could guarantee the 
company raising enough money. 
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Figure 8: CPG CAR in Short Term 
This figure shows acquirer’s CAR changes during the 61-day event window, (-30, 30). 
 
 
The CAR during event window (-2, 2) equals -0.0181. However, we cannot 
calculate the total wealth loss based on this result, since the t-test of this 5-day 
window is not significant and the only significant value of abnormal return during 
our event window is on Day 1 (the abnormal return equals -0.0236 with a t-
statistic equals -2.0296). In addition, this result could be affected by the closing of 
asset acquisitions as well, although there was little information related to the 
Manitoba deal before announcement. Given the formula established from our 
large sample analysis, the size difference of this deal is 0.95, which is located 
between median and upper quartile of our large sample distribution and is 
expected to contribute to a positive CAR. The market to book ratio in this case is 
2.21, in the upper half of the Canadian subsample. It would be associated with a 
negative CAR. Additionally, the public target status would have a negative impact 
on CAR in Canadian market. These factors interweave together resulting in an 
ambiguous prediction of the CAR. The other explanation for the insignificant 
CAR is that there are many M&As and private placement deals occurring during 
our estimation window although we excluded CPG’s largest acquisition deal in 














7.1.4. Financial Fundamentals 
Financial fundamentals represent the influence and real power of a company, 
especially in an industry like oil and gas. Several key statistics of CPG are 
summarized in Table 16. 
Table 16: Financial Fundamentals of CPG 
This table presents the financial fundamentals of CPG at the year-end before and after the acquisition announcement. 




Currency CAD CAD 
Total Revenue 1,822.5 2,232.2 
  Growth Over Prior Year 41.1% 22.5% 
Gross Profit 1,470.3 1,744.9 
  Margin % 80.7% 78.2% 
EBIT 327.7 350.7 
  Margin % 18.0% 15.7% 
Net Income 201.1 190.7 
  Margin % 11.0% 8.5% 
Return on Assets % 2.5% 2.1% 
Total Debt/Equity 18.8% 17.2% 
Unlevered Free Cash Flow -   Growth Over Prior Year 1,581.1%
12
 154.9% 
Diluted EPS 0.72 0.57 
Full Time Employees 487 599 
Production related Information   
Avg. Price/bbl, Oil (Hedged) 83.99 79.63 
Avg. Price/bbl, Oil (Unhedged) 87.62 80.51 
Total Production, Oil (MMbbls) 24.3 32.7 
Production Growth, Oil 20.9% 34.7% 
Total Oil Equivalent Production (MMboe) 26.9 36.0 
Avg. Price/mcf, Gas (Hedged) 4.39 3.18 
Avg. Price/mcf, Gas (Unhedged) 3.87 2.61 
Total Production, Gas (Bcf) 15.8 19.8 
Production Growth, Gas 9.8% 25.7% 
Total Gas Equivalent Production (Bcfe) 161.6 216.3 
                                                 
12
 The UFCF is 192.6, 6.5, 109.6 and 279.4 million of CAD at the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
fiscal year-end respectively. The UFCF is very low in 2010 due to the company tripled their 




As we can see from Table 16, total revenue, gross profit and net income keep a 
strong growth rate in both our deal announced year and the year before. This 
Canadian firm also keeps a comparatively low leverage, represented by total debt 
over equity.  A large amount of cash acquisition, $1,855.7 million in 2012 
compared with $205.9 million in 2011, is accompanied by a dramatic increase of 
unlevered free cash flow according to its financials shown in Capital IQ. It 
supports the previous literature about firms in industry cluster with lower leverage 
and higher cash flow. We could also see a growth in full time employees 
approximately 23%. Their production data is in good condition as well. There is 
production growth in both oil and gas. Their 3.5 year price risk management 
program helps to hold a relatively stable oil price. Overall, the company is in a 
healthy financial condition before and after the acquisition. In addition, it is 
worthwhile to notice that several deals occurred in 2012 which also contribute to 
the final financial number of 2012. 
7.1.5. Summary 
    When the acquirer selects a target, the geographically related oil resource plays 
is more crucial than the geographical proximity of the two headquarters of the 
acquirer and target. In other words, the synergy generated by soft information is 
not as critical as the strategic integration of production. Moreover, the Canadian 
acquirer shows their positive attitudes towards large size difference, which is 
consistent with our large sample analysis. In the same vein as Eckbo et al. (1990), 
a mixture of payment methods leads to a positive CAR, which is also consistent 
with the fact that the use of warrants has become more common recently. 
However it is not sufficient to judge a transaction simply based on the short term 
performance of the acquirer. Because we could see that the financial fundamentals 
of acquirer at the year after acquisition, year-end 2012, are still healthy and 
powerful. Notably, CPG’s 3.5 years WTI hedge strategy helps them to maintain a 
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certain level of risk and provide continuous dividends. This strategy adopted in 
some O&G firms may help explain why we did not get a significant result of WTI 
crude oil index in our multivariate regression. 
7.2. Houston-based Linn Energy and LinnCo acquires Denver-based 
Berry Petroleum 
7.2.1. Case Background 
Established in 2003, Linn Energy, LLC is an independent oil and gas company 
whose properties are diversified in the United States. LinnCo, LLC, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of LINE, went public on October 12, 2012. LNCO focuses on 
raising additional equity capital for LINE to realize its acquisition plans. In the 
M&A history of LINE and its subsidiaries, only 3 out of 34 deals are acquisitions 
of another company. The deal value of these three acquisitions is not in excess of 
$450 million for each transaction. In 2013, LINE and LNCO conducted their 
largest deal, $4.3 billion acquisition of Berry Petroleum (BRY), in their corporate 
history. It was the only corporate acquisition by LINE and its subsidiaries in 2013 
and was one of the top 10 oil and gas upstream
13
 transactions in the United States 
in 2013. 




16”, LINE and LNCO announced a definitive merger agreement 
with publicly traded BRY on Feb 21st, 2013. In the transaction, LNCO would 
issue 1.25 common shares in exchange for each common share of BRY. Then, 
                                                 
13
 There are three segments in the oil and gas industry: the upstream involves exploring, 
producing, and the processing; the midstream involves storing, transporting and marketing; and 
the downstream involves refining and distributing to the retailer. 
14
 C-Corp is a corporation is taxed separately from its owners, which means there is a drawback of 
double taxation.  
15
 LLC is a limited liability company which combines the characteristics of a corporation and a 
partnership. 
16
 MLP is a master limited partnership which avoids corporate income tax. 
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BRY would be converted into a LLC. Eventually, LINE would acquire BRY as an 
asset using LINE units. The stock-for-stock merger was expected to complete on 
June 30, 2012. Mark E. Ellis, the Chairman, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of LINE and LNCO said, “We created LinnCo to provide an additional 
way for institutional and retail shareholders to invest in LINN and to give the 
company greater access to capital. In addition, as evidenced today with our 
announcement of a merger agreement with Berry, LinnCo has provided us with 
the right currency and structural flexibility to merge with C-Corps in a tax 
efficient manner.” (Press release, LINN Energy Announces Fourth Quarter and 
Full-Year 2012 Results and 2013 Outlook, February 21, 2013.) However, as 
Murphy's laws stated “Nothing is as easy as it looks.” It took them almost one 
year to close the deal. Events occurring during the acquisition period are 
summarized below and those events with stars are directly related with our case; 
February 21, 2013, the first announcement date of BRY’s deal, is set as Day 0. 
*Day 0 (Feb 21, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced the merger deal and their 
“Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2012 Results and 2013 Outlook”. 
*Day 17 (Mar 18, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced that they have received 
early termination of the waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Act, 
which became effective on Mar 13, 2013 (Day 14). 
Day 30 (Apr 4, 2013): LINE’s subsidiaries announced a $525 million deal to 
sell its oil-weighted properties in the Western Anadarko Basin to Midstates 
Petroleum Company LLC. 
Day 45 (Apr 25, 2013): LINE and LNCO changed their distribution and 
dividend policies from quarterly payment of $0.725 to monthly payment of 
$0.2416 beginning in the second quarter of 2013. (Their dividend is slightly 
higher than CPG’s dividend.) 
*Day 70 (May 31, 2013): LINE and LNCO extended the proposed closing date 
of BRY’s merger to the third quarter of 2013 because the Registration Statement 
was still reviewed by SEC. 
*Day 91 (July 1, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced that an informal SEC 
inquiry had commenced, which was relevant to their financial disclosure and 
proposed BRY merger. 
*Day 141 (Sept 11, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced that they received 
comments about the Amended Registration Statement on Aug 9, 2013 (Day 119) 
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and set the record dates regarding the BRY merger meetings as of Sept 30, 2013 
(Day 154). 
Day 142 (Sept 12, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced a $525 million 
acquisition of Permian Basin Properties, which is expected to close during the 
fourth quarter of 2013. 
*Day 174 (Oct 28, 2013): LINE and LNCO made an announcement about 
filing of Amendment No. 6 to the Registration Statement since they received 
comments on Oct 25, 2013 (Day 173). 
*Day 178 (Nov 1, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced that there were no 
further comments on Amendment No. 6. 
*Day 179 (Nov 4, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced the amended merger 
agreement with an increase of exchange ratio to 1.68 from 1.25. The total 
consideration is $4.9 billion and the expected closing date was extended to Jan 31, 
2014 (Day 239). They set the record date of Nov 14, 2013 (Day 187). 
*Day 187 (Nov 14, 2013): LINE and LNCO announced that the final 
Registration Statement had been declared effective by SEC and set the merger 
vote date on Dec 16, 2013 (Day 208).  




7.2.2. LINE and LNCO’s Motivation for Purchasing BRY 
The merger will benefit LINE’s unitholders and LNCO’s shareholders from 
various aspects. In the first place, BRY’s assets are considered as “highly 
complementary assets” based on LINE and LNCO’s press release as BRY’s 
properties are close to LINE’s existing assets and add a new core area in the Uinta 
Basin. The complete deal will increase LINE’s production by 30% and proved 
reserves by 34%, approximately 240 MMcf/d
17
 and 1.65 Tcfe
18
. It will also 
contribute to the number of LINE’s producing wells and net acres. Moreover, the 
majority production of BRY is oil. While the gas price is low during 2013, it is 
reasonable to acquirer more oil properties. 
                                                 
17
 1 MMcf/d equals one million cubic feet per day. 
18
 1 Tcfe equals one trillion cubic feet equivalents. 
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The second benefit is incurred via a deferred tax liability for LINE. As an 
investment vehicle for LINE, LNCO is responsible for raising capital and 
accomplishing acquisitions under the growth strategy of LINE. After the 
acquisition, BRY was converted to a LLC of LNCO. Later, by using a units-assets 
exchange, LINE owns BRY’s assets without paying tax immediately. It is also 
tax-free for BRY’s shareholders. 
Last but not least, BRY’s deal will contribute to LINE’s distributable cash 
flow. As LINE stated in the Registration Statement, “the transaction is expected to 
be highly accretive to distributable cash flow per unit. In the first full year 
following closing, accretion is expected to be in excess of $0.40 per unit”.  
However, that is the most controversial part of this deal. According to a report 
from Barron’s published on May 4, 2013, the author, Andrew Bary, thought that 
LINE was trying to “prettify its financial statement” through a large acquisition. 
7.2.3. Shareholder Value Implications 
We obtain the long term stock price and trading volume of both LINE and 
LNCO from Yahoo Finance. The abnormal returns and t-statistics are calculated 
through Eventus. We focus on merger-related events reported on either LINE’s or 
LNCO’s website. The press release date of deal announcement is referred to as 
the announcement date. The estimation window of LINE is from June 21, 2012 to 
December 13, 2012, including 120 trading days. The estimation period of LNCO 







Figure 9: LINE and LNCO Stock Price in Long Term 
This figure presents LINE and LNCO Stock Price from 1/2/2013 to 1/30/2014. The dot on the graph denotes the deal 
announcement date. 
Panel A - LINE 
 
Panel B - LNCO 
 




When we shed some lights on the long-term stock performance, the stock price 
of respective companies sharply decreased on July 1, 2013. On that day, LINE 
and LNCO announced that SEC commenced an informal inquiry over their non-
GAAP financial measures, hedging strategies and proposed merger with BRY. 
Although the companies said they remained confident of completing the merger 
and announced the monthly distribution and dividend on the same day, the market 
still took the inquiry as a bad signal, which increased the uncertainty of deal 
completion. With huge trading volume, LINE, LNCO, and BRY’s stock price 
dropped 19%, 17% and 6%, respectively. It is not the first time that the public 
questioned LINE’s non-GAAP accounting methods and hedging strategy. This 
class of questions could date back prior to the announcement of BRY’s merger. 
On February 16, 2013, a week before the deal announcement, Andrew Bary 
published an article cast doubt on the hedging strategy of LINE which led to a 
decrease of LINE’s stock price. But the merger announcement pushed up LINE’s 
stock price. When SEC inquired about this problem, the market reacted extremely 
negative and followed with an array of class actions lawsuits against LINE and 
LNCO. 
There was another sharp decrease in LINE and LNCO’s stock price on May 31, 
2013 due to the extension of deal completion date. It seems like the market 
perceived the merger deal as a value-increasing transaction because the market 
responded negatively to events that decrease the probability of successful 
completing the merger. Moreover, the stock price increased when there was an 
event increasing the possibility of deal completion. The relevant events are deal 
announcement (Feb 21, 2013), received comments on Amended Registration 
Statement (Sept 11, 2013), and announcement of amended merger agreement 
(Nov 4, 2013). However, it is hard to explain why the stock price fell after the 
announcement of the completion of the merger, although it bounced back three 
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days after the announcement. Table 17 presents LINE and LNCO’s performance 
compared with the entire market. 
Table 17: Chronology of major events in the merger of BRY by LNCO and 
LINE 
The announcement date refers to the press release date. The abnormal return is calculated for a three-day window 
including the announcement date and the trading date just before and after the announcement date. The estimation window 








2/21/13 6.90%*** 7.32%*** Deal announcement 
 3.741 6.615 
3/18/13 -1.45% -1.39% Early termination of waiting period 
 -0.786 -1.257 
5/31/13 -4.27%** -1.63%* Pending closing time of merger 
 -2.327 -1.519 
7/01/13 -18.60%*** -15.78%*** Informal SEC inquiry commenced 
 -10.129 -14.725 
9/11/13 14.35%*** 13.24%*** Received comments about the Amended 
Registration Statement  7.817 12.354 
10/28/13 -1.80% -3.65%*** Filedof Amendment No. 6 
 -0.980 -3.411 
11/01/13 12.69%*** 10.77%*** No further comments from SEC 
 6.908 10.057 
11/04/13 10.78%*** 7.66%*** Announced amended merger agreement  
 5.870 7.154 
11/14/13 1.15% -1.13% SEC accepted the final Registration 
Statement and set vote date  0.628 -1.059 
12/16/13 -3.58%* -6.26%*** Deal completion 
 -1.951 -5.845 




3.48% -1.62% *we excluded the three-day CAR of event 
happen on 11/01/13 (Fri.) because it is 
overlapped with the following event 
0.628 -0.564 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
The number and sign of abnormal return support our presumptions from Figure 
9. Furthermore, whole process of merger contributes zero abnormal return 
towards both LINE and LNCO since the t-statistics are insignificant. Yet, there is 
a significantly positive abnormal return if we only consider the announcement of 
merger agreement and amended merger agreement. The size difference equals 
0.55 if we take the difference of combined market value of LINE and LNCO 
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minus the first announced transaction value over the combined market value, 
which is located in the lower quartile of large sample. The MB ratio of LINE and 
LNCO are 1.87 and 1.04, respectively. These factors will not affect the U.S. 
acquirer’s performance in our large sample. The 100% stock transaction of 
acquiring a public target receives a positive market response at the deal 
announcement period, which is consistent with our large sample analysis result. 
 
7.2.4. Financial Fundamentals 
Table 18: Financial Fundamentals of LINE and LNCO 
This table presents the financial fundamentals of LINE (Panel A) and LNCO (Panel B) at the year-end before and after 
the acquisition announcement. 
Panel A: LINE   




Currency USD USD 
Total Revenue 1,649.5 2,153.8 
Growth Over Prior Year 40.7% 30.6% 
Gross Profit 1,222.6 1,614.9 
Margin % 74.1% 75.0% 
EBIT 412.9 582.8 
Margin % 25.0% 27.1% 
Net Income (386.6) (691.3) 
Margin % (23.4%) (32.1%) 
Return on Assets % 2.7% 2.6% 
Total Debt/Equity 136.4% 155.7% 
Unlevered Free Cash Flow -   Growth 
Over Prior Year 
NM NM 
Diluted EPS ($1.92) ($2.94) 
Full Time Employees 1,136 1,645 
Production related Information 
  
Avg. Price/bbl, Oil (Hedged) - - 
Avg. Price/bbl, Oil (Unhedged) $88.59 $94.15 
Total Production, Oil (MMbbls) 10.7 12.2 
Production Growth, Oil 35.8% 14.7% 
Total Oil Equivalent Production (MMboe) 40.8 50.0 
Avg. Price/mcf, Gas (Hedged) - - 
Avg. Price/mcf, Gas (Unhedged) $2.87 $3.62 
Total Production, Gas (Bcf) 127.4 161.7 
Production Growth, Gas 99.4% 26.9% 
Total Gas Equivalent Production (Bcfe) 245.0 300.1 
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Panel B: LNCO   




Currency USD USD 
Total Revenue N/A N/A 
  Growth Over Prior Year N/A N/A 
Gross Profit N/A N/A 
  Margin % N/A N/A 
EBIT (1.8) (2.1) 
  Margin % N/A N/A 
Net Income 31.0 (912.4) 
  Margin % N/A N/A 
Return on Assets % N/A (0.1%) 
Total Debt/Equity N/A N/A 
Unlevered Free Cash Flow -   Growth 
Over Prior Year 
N/A N/A 
Diluted EPS $2.88 ($23.46) 
Full Time Employees N/A N/A 
Production related Information N/A N/A 
 
Although LINE’s total revenue increased 30.6%, its net income shrank 
approximately 32%. However, both LINE and LNCO paid approximately $2.9 
distribution/dividend per unit/share. Regardless of the negative net income and 
diluted EPS, LINE received ratings upgrades by both Moody's from B2 to B1 and 
Standard & Poor's from B+ to BB- after the completion of the merger. While the 
production continues to increase, LINE announced $1.6 billion capital budgets 
devoted to expansion of both LINE and BRY assets in their 2014 outlook. 
7.2.5. Summary 
LINE perfects the sentence “Cash is king”. LINE and LNCO increase their 
distributable cash flow per unit successfully through M&As. By employing an 
advanced investment vehicle and maintaining a high dividend, LINE and LNCO 
attracted many investors to their company. Then, they used the money to make 
new M&As. The market’s support of this strategy is reflected in both the stock 
price increase and the positive abnormal return when the deal was announced. 
However, the net income based on GAAP accounting method tells another story. 
Despite the fact that LINE pays a higher distribution than CPG on a dollar basis, 
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its assets integration is far behind CPG as its properties are scattered throughout 
the U.S. It reminds us to be aware of the distinction between long-term benefits 
and short-term benefits. 
7.3. Oklahoma City-based Continental Resources acquires Enid-based 
Wheatland Oil 
7.3.1. Case Background 
Relative to the acquirers in prior case studies, Continental Resources, Inc. 
(CLR) has a long history. It was founded in 1967 in Oklahoma by its current 
Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Harold G. Hamm. It focuses on 
exploring, developing and producing of crude oil and natural gas properties in 
north, south and east parts of the United States. Concentrated on organic growth, 
CLR conducted few M&As before 2010. However, the CLR’s revenue from 
exploration and production activities shows exponential growth since 2010, 
accompanied by several mergers and acquisitions. The other unique characteristic 
of CLR is that it sells its crude oil production to midstream companies, and to end 
users. This makes the firm as a complete marketing chain in the oil and gas 
industry. In addition, the top shareholder of CLR is neither any companies nor 
other institutions as of April 2014. The insider, Harold G. Hamm, holds more than 
75% of common shares outstanding which has market value of approximately 
US$18.3 billion. (He owned 68% of CLR as of March 2012.) By studying this 
company, we are looking forward to have a better understanding of M&As 
reorganizing and corporate governance of a closely held public company 
conducting a non-arm’s length transaction. 
On March 28, 2012, CLR announced the acquisition of Wheatland Oil Inc 
(Wheatland) from Harold G. Hamm and Jeff Hume for $340 million using a collar 
consideration structure. Harold G. Hamm, the Chairman of Board, CEO and 
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majority shareholder of CLR, owned 75% of Wheatland through his Revocable 
Inter Vivo Trust
19
 and Jeff Hume, the President and COO of CLR, owned the 
remainder of Wheatland. CLR would issue between 3.9 million and 4.25 million 
of its shares, subject to 20 day average of the daily sale prices prior to closing of 
the transaction. If the price of CLR is less than $80, 4.25 million shares will be 
issuable. If its price is greater than $87.18, 3.9 million shares will be issuable. 
During the bid period, there was a large amount of senior management transitions 
and a lawsuit with respect to the potential purchase. Several senior management 
transitions were announced from April to May 2012: Mike Cantrell joined CLR as 
VP of Government and Regulatory Affairs on April 11, 2012. Jose A. Bayardo 
joined CLR as Senior VP of Business Development on April 16, 2012. Jeff Hume, 
CLR's President and COO, named the role of Vice Chairman of Strategic Growth 
Initiatives and Rick Bott succeeded Hume’s position on May 14, 2012. Kirk 
Kinnear joined CLR as VP of Oil Marketing Logistics. Ultimately, the purchase 
was completed on August 13, 2012 and 3.92 million shares of CLR were issued. 
7.3.2. CLR’s Motivation for Purchasing Wheatland Oil 
As with former cases, the primary motivation of this merger is to add to CLR’s 
ownership of properties in the Bakken field. With the help of technology 
development on horizontal drilling, CLR pursued acquisitions of additional 
interests in the Bakken field according to its 2010 Annual Report.  In November 
of 2010, Wheatland asked CLR if they were interested in their assets. In 
November of 2011, CLR started to consider Wheatland's proposal and established 
a special committee. This purchase includes 37,900 net acres in the North Dakota 
and Montana Bakken play and interests in more than 1,000 gross wells, with net 
                                                 
19
 Revocable Inter Vivo Trust is established to provide that the assets held therein are to be for the 
lifetime benefit of the Settlor. (Creighton Law Offices, 2014) 
70 
 
proved reserves of 17 MMBoe according to CLR’s press release. The deal would 
be consistent with CLR’s strategy of expansion. 
The second motivation is that CLR has private information about Wheatland 
since those two companies are controlled by the same person, Harold G. Hamm. It 
means that CLR is more competitive as a bidder of Wheatland. However, the self-
dealing issue occurred in this circumstance. Even though the beneficiaries, Harold 
G. Hamm and Jeff Hume, were excluded from the special committee, there was 
still a close tie between executive's private interests and CLR. A lawsuit, filed by 
a Louisiana police pension fund, alleged that CLR breached its fiduciary duties to 
minority shareholders on June 12, 2012. Harold G. Hamm, CEO of CLR and 
owned 75% of Wheatland, stated that Wheatland deal was similarly vetted and 
approved by the board of CLR, which would benefit all shareholders. In the end, 
the motion for a preliminary injunction of the deal was denied. 
It is worthwhile to notice that CLR made a collar offer towards the Wheatland 
deal showing its willingness to complete the deal. According to Branch and Yang 
(2003) and Officer (2004), a collar consideration structure will increase the 
probability of merger completion in a stock payment. This structure decreases the 
likelihood of renegotiation before the deal completion. It also signals the 
uncertainty of both acquirer and target stock price, corresponding to high standard 
deviations from the market model in the following part. 
7.3.3. Shareholder Value Implications 
We examine the long-term stock price and trading volume to show the 
tendency of CLR’s performance. Then, we compute the short-term cumulative 




Figure 10: CLR Stock Price in Long Term 
This figure presents CLR Stock Price from 8/21/2011 to 10/1/2012. The dot on the graph denotes the deal 
announcement date. 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance 
 
We conclude that the stock price of CLR is quite volatile from August 1, 2011 
to October 1, 2012 from Figure 10. Various kinds of news drive the price change. 
For example, CLR received two violation notices from state Health Department 
on November 1, 2011, leading to a drop of stock price; the CEO of CLR, Harold 
G. Hamm, was named as energy adviser to presidential candidate Mitt Romney on 
March 1, 2012, leading to a decline of stock price; the announcement of 2012 first 
quarter result indicated that sales of oil and gas missed the firm’s expectations on 
May 2, 2012, leading to a decline of stock price; a series of turnover in 
management team on April 11, April 16, May 14, and May 25 of 2012, leading to 
an increase of stock price. There are still lots of other news during the estimation 
period and our event period. 
Due to the high volatility of CLR’s stock price, it is hard to obtain a significant 
t-statistics in standard event study. If we employ a 120-day estimation window 
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from August 1, 2011 to January 23, 2012 and a 61-day event window from 
February 14, 2012 to May 10, 2012, we could get CAR shown in Figure 6. The t-
statistics of CAR is not significant in (-1, 1) and that of abnormal return is also 
not significant in the individual days from Day -2 to Day 2. However, we could 
obtain a significant abnormal return on the deal announcement day if we choose a 
relatively quiet period of CLR, from October 5, 2012 to December 30, 2012, as 
our 61-day estimation window. 
Figure 11: CLR CAR in Short Term 
This figure shows acquirer’s CAR changes during the 61-day event window (-30, 30). 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 11, the abnormal return on event date is negative, 
consistent with our previous conclusion that a private target status has a negative 
impact on acquirer’s performance. However, a 100% stock payment transaction is 
expected to bring a positive CAR to the acquirer. More interestingly, CLR moved 
its headquarters from Enid to Oklahoma City on March 27, 2012, the day right 
before deal announcement. The case is not a local deal according to our large 












7.3.4. Financial Fundamentals 
Table 19: Financial Fundamentals of CLR 
This table presents the financial fundamentals of CLR at the year-end before and after the acquisition announcement. 




Currency USD USD 
Total Revenue 1,679.8 2,418.5 
  Growth Over Prior Year 73.2% 44.0% 
Gross Profit 1,370.1 1,962.4 
  Margin % 81.6% 81.1% 
EBIT 743.1 1,164.6 
  Margin % 44.2% 48.2% 
Net Income 429.1 739.4 
  Margin % 25.5% 30.6% 
Return on Assets % 10.1% 9.8% 
Total Debt/Equity 54.3% 111.9% 
Unlevered Free Cash Flow -   Growth 
Over Prior Year 
(56.7%) (105.9%) 
Diluted EPS $2.41 $4.07 
Full Time Employees 609 753 
Production related Information   
Avg. Price/bbl, Oil (Hedged) - - 
Avg. Price/bbl, Oil (Unhedged) $88.51 $84.59 
Total Production, Oil (MMbbls) 16.5 25.1 
Production Growth, Oil 39.3% 52.0% 
Total Oil Equivalent Production 
(MMboe) 
22.6 35.7 
Avg. Price/mcf, Gas (Hedged) - - 
Avg. Price/mcf, Gas (Unhedged) $5.24 $4.2 
Total Production, Gas (Bcf) 36.7 63.9 
Production Growth, Gas 53.2% 74.0% 
Total Gas Equivalent Production (Bcfe) 135.5 214.3 
 
CLR has a rather excellent financial statement with a steady marginal growth of 
total revenue and net income. The diluted EPS increased dramatically in the year 
following the merger deal. It also receives a BBB- credit rating from S&P. 
Comparing with LINE, CLR put more focus on organic growth of production 
development. Despite a high turnover rate of managements during the merger 





Unlike the other American deal, CLR concentrates on exploring and 
developing its core assets in Oklahoma. Although there is a close tie between its 
executives and the Wheatland deal, this merger provides CLR more access to the 
Bakken oil play and increased its production level. It is a successful corporate 
restructuring based on CLR’s financial fundamentals and stock performance in 
long term. As expected, the cumulative abnormal return in the short term is not 
the exclusive benchmark of a successful mergers and acquisitions. Since it is 
widely used in academic research, we might overestimate its function of judging 
whether the deal is successful or not. 
In summation, these three out of sample case studies broaden our perspectives 
on firm specific characteristics. The geographical proximity of working fields is 
crucial for the O&G acquirers, which is the source of cost synergy. Furthermore, 
the ownership structure would have a strong impact on management’s decision. It 
seems that the M&A will progress smoothly if the management of the target 
would obtain a competitive position in the acquirer or in the Newco. Last but not 
least, the interconnection between corporations and their boards will trigger an 
M&A transaction. However, this relation is hard to capture without an in-depth 
investigation and evaluation. 
8. Conclusion 
With a preliminary research of M&As in the O&G industry between 2002 and 
2011, we know that countries with abundant oil and gas resources, such as 
Canada and United States, have a large volume of transactions. The O&G 
acquirers tend to invest in the same or related industry and conduct more assets 
acquisitions. The acquirers who engage in transactions including the change of 
corporate control are mostly public firms and willing to invest in private, public 
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and subsidiary target. As for North American deals, we find that Canadian 
acquirers are more likely to invest in horizontal, local target and public target than 
U.S. acquirers, along with a higher complete rate. There are also more penny 
stocks and illiquid stocks in Canada because the firm size is larger in the United 
States. 
We conclude that the low stock price of penny stock is not because of the 
underestimation of the firm performance. In addition, penny stocks face a higher 
level of idiosyncratic risk and illiquidity issue. As for those non-penny stocks, the 
U.S. market react positively towards stock payment in the large sample analysis, 
which is supported by case study. We suggest that the acquirer takes it as a 
method to share the risk with the target, accompanied by a collar consideration 
structure to protect the target’s benefits according to the case study. In the 
Canadian market, the value firm generate more abnormal return relative to the 
glamour firm. The case study supports that the merger conducted by the Canadian 
value firm has a better long-term performance. Furthermore, the result indicates 
that the synergy generated from the geographical proximity of headquarters is not 
significant and even negative for penny stock. Our case studies suggest the 
geographical proximity of the oil and gas field is more important to the acquirer.  
By employing different event windows, the Canadian subsample results show 
that the idiosyncratic risk is negatively related to acquirer’s CAR before the deal 
announcement and positively related to acquirer’s CAR at the deal announcement, 
indicating that the spread of rumor will push up the stock price of the “predictable 
firm” before the deal announcement and the stock price of the “unpredictable 
firm” will increase after the confirmation of the rumor, in other words, the 
announcement of the deal. We conclude that the market react differently towards 
the rumor when the level of idiosyncratic risk varies. 
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9. Further Research 
First of all, it is worthwhile to investigate the effect of the geographical 
proximity of the oil and gas fields on acquirer’s performance since it is expected 
to be the source of cost reduction. The acquirers emphasize the relation between 
the target’s assets and their existing properties in the proxy statement. Then, they 
elaborate how the acquired firm would contribute to the acquiring firm’s 
production. As with the situation shown in our cases, bidder’s acquisition strategy 
always includes acquisition of assets for controlling the working interests in 
certain regions. 
Secondly, it will be interesting to consider the effect of assets acquisition in 
future study, especially for a large-scale industry like oil and gas. Actually, there 
are approximately 50% transactions are acquisitions of assets over the period 
2002-2011 in the oil and gas industry. It is possible to find two transactions 
occurring on the same date, however, the one with small transaction value is 
acquisition of corporate and the other one with large transaction value is 
acquisition of assets. 
In addition, the ownership structure and the deal structure are two important 
determinants that should also be taken into consideration. In the third case study, 
we notice that the CEO is the largest shareholder of the acquirer. The concerns 
from a management who holds the majority of shares should be distinctive from a 
management without shares in the acquirer. Also, we observe the use of collar 
consideration structure in the third case and the application of toehold strategy in 
our first case study. These deal structures show the acquirer’s determination to 
success a deal. As a result, the likelihood of deal completion should increase. It 
would be interesting to see the market reaction towards various deal structure. 
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Last, the interconnections between the acquirer and the target will have an 
impact on the final decision of the M&A, especially in a complex industry like 
O&G. Different types of relation is existing in all three case studies. Given that 
the O&G firms are clustered in several provinces/states with abundant natural 
resources, it is not surprising that the management from different companies 
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Appendix A.1: A snapshot of horizontal merger difference between U.S. and 
Canada in mining and manufacturing industry 
 
Reprint from: Eckbo (1992) 
96 
 
Appendix A.2: Variable Definitions  
Variables Definitions Data Sources 
Panel A - measures of acquisition performance 
Status Binary variable=1 if deal is completed; 0 otherwise SDC 
ACAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for acquirer CRSP; CFMRC 
Panel B - firm and deal characteristics 
Sizediff Market value of acquirer minus transaction value of 
the deal then scaled by market value of acquirer 
Compustat; SDC 
MB ratio Acquirer’s closing price of the day before deal 
announcement divided by the book value per share 
of the year before deal announcement 
CRSP; CFMRC; 
Compustat 
SIC Binary variable=1 if target and acquirer are in the 
same industry; 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Geo Binary variable=1 if target and acquirer are in the 
same city; 0 otherwise 
Compustat; SDC; 
Factiva; EDGAR; 
Sedar; Capital IQ; 





Binary variable=1 if target’s ultimate parent firm is 
public firm; 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Stock Binary variable=1 if payment is 100% stock 
payment; 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Illiquidity Binary variable=1 if usable returns from estimation 
window less than 120 in the U.S. subsample or 
usable returns from estimation window less than 
100 in the Canadian subsample; 0 otherwise 
Eventus; CFMRC 
AdjRsq The adjusted r-squared of the estimation window is 
obtained from event study 
Eventus; CFMRC 
Idiosyn Idiosyncratic risk equals    
    
  
 ; the    of 
estimation window is obtained from event study 
Eventus; CFMRC 
Penny Stock Binary variable=1 if acquirer’s closing price of the 
day before deal announcement less than $5; 0 
otherwise 
CRSP;CFMRC 
Cash BS Cash from balance sheet Compustat 
Leverage Total liabilities over stockholders' equity Compustat 
Canada Binary variable=1 if acquirer is from Canada; 0 
otherwise 
Compustat 
Panel C - market characteristics 
CL1 Generic 1st crude oil futures price Bloomberg 
Percentage 
change of CL1 
the CL1 price at day 0 divided by price at day -10, 
then minus 1 
Bloomberg 
Contraction Binary variable=1 if mergers and acquisitions 
happened in the contraction period; 0 otherwise 
National Bureau of 
Economic Research 
website 
Lagged GDP Last year GDP divided by the year before GDP World Bank website 
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Appendix A.3.1: Sample Distribution Classed by Penny Stock 
This table presents our final sample distribution of numerical variables, including minimum, lower quartile, median, 
upper quartile, maximum, mean and standard deviation, categorized by penny stock. Sizediff represents the size difference 
between acquirer and target scaled by acquirer’s size. MB_ratio represents the market to book ratio of acquirer. Acquirer 
size represents the log of market value of total assets in the year-end before announcement. Leverage represents the 
acquirer’s total liability divided by its book equity. Idiosyn represents the idiosyncratic risk of acquirer. AdjRsq is obtained 
from the event study of acquirer. 
 Variable N Obs Min 25% Median 75% Max Mean Std Dev 
Penny Stock Sizediff 68 -5.77 0.24 0.71 0.86 1.00 0.32 1.10 
 MB_ratio 68 0.14 0.76 1.42 2.62 36.03 2.75 4.90 
 Acquirer size 68 1.48 3.47 4.17 4.96 6.52 4.19 1.11 
 Leverage 68 0.01 0.25 0.59 1.16 42.96 1.63 5.29 
 Idiosyn 64 0.07 1.87 2.85 4.69 10.20 3.38 2.00 
 AdjRsq 68 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.48 0.07 0.09 
Non-penny Sizediff 249 -1.77 0.62 0.89 0.98 1.00 0.73 0.40 
 MB_ratio 249 0.41 1.65 2.14 3.02 20.02 2.69 2.13 
 Acquirer size 249 3.39 6.27 6.99 8.48 12.89 7.44 1.79 
 Leverage 249 0.02 0.60 0.98 1.38 5.51 1.13 0.77 
 Idiosyn 243 -1.31 0.82 1.48 2.24 7.21 1.65 1.42 
 AdjRsq 249 -0.02 0.08 0.17 0.30 0.79 0.21 0.18 
 
Appendix A.3.2: Difference in means and medians Classed by Penny Stock 
This table presents the differences, Penny Stock minus Non-penny, in means and medians, categorized by variables 
from A.3.1. We use a t-test to examine the significance of differences in means and a Wilcoxon two-sample test to examine 
the significance of differences in medians. The p-values of the t-test and the Wilcoxon two-sample test are shown in the 
brackets. 
Variable Diff. of means P-value Diff. of medians P-value 
Sizediff -0.40*** (0.0000) -0.18*** (<.0001) 
MB_ratio 0.06 (0.8783) -0.72*** (<.0001) 
Acquirer size -3.25*** (0.0000) -2.82*** (<.0001) 
Leverage 0.51 (0.2137) -0.40*** (0.0001) 
Idiosyn 1.73*** (0.0000) 1.36*** (<.0001) 
AdjRsq -0.15*** (0.0000) -0.13*** (<.0001) 





Appendix A.4: A snapshot of bidder announcement returns categorized by 
target public status 
 Reprint from: Betton et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
